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Employee Speech & Management
Rights:
A Counterintuitive Reading of
Garcetti v. Ceballos
Elizabeth Dalet
In the two years since the decision came down, courts and commentators
generally have agreed that the Supreme Court's decision in Garcetti v.
Ceballos sharply limited the First Amendment rights of public employees. In
this Article, I argue that this widely shared interpretation overstates the case.
The Court in Garcetti did not dramatically change the way it analyzed public
employees' First Amendment rights. Instead, it restated the principles on
which those claims rest, emphasizing management rights and the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine. By making those two theories the
centerpiece of the decision, the Court in Garcetti defined public employee
speech rights in a way that may ultimately strengthen the hand of public
employees.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
For more than forty years the United States Supreme Court has
recognized a First Amendment protection of public employees' free speech
rights.' Last year the Court revisited those protections in Garcetti v.
Ceballos,2 and found that an assistant district attorney could not make a
First Amendment claim for speech on a matter within the scope of his
duties.
In the two years since, court and commentators generally have agreed
that Garcetti sharply limited the First Amendment rights of public
employees. 3 Yet this widely held conventional wisdom overstates the case.
1. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). Pickering is typically characterized as the
first case to recognize this right. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICIES 1069 (2d ed. 2002), but in Pickering the Court declared that its decision in that case was
part of a long line of cases, stretching back to Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (reversing a
state court's decision to uphold the withholding of state employees' salaries for failure to complete a
loyalty oath) and beyond. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. The Court reiterated that history in Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983) ("a state cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes
the employee's constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression") and Garcetti v. Ceballos,
126 S. Ct. 1951, 1955 (2006), (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 138).
2. 126 S. Ct. 1951.
3. See, e.g., Broderick v. Evans, No. 02-CV-1 1540-RGS, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23698, at *3
(D. Mass. Mar. 30, 2007) ("Garcetti represents something of a sea change in First Amendment law
governing employee speech."). But see Black v. Columbus Public Sch., No. 2:96-cv-326, 2006 U.S.
Dist LEXIS 57768, at *11-12 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 16, 2006) (Garcetti did not change the law in the Sixth
Circuit). See generally, e.g., Kathryn B. Cooper, Note, Garcetti v. Ceballos: The Dual Threshold
Requirement Challenging Public Employee Free Speech, 8 LoY. J. PUB. INT. L. 73 (2006) (generally
criticizing the decision and preferring Souter's dissent); Leading Cases, 120 HARV. L. REv. 273 (2006)
(Garcetti "departs from precedent"); Jamie Sasser, Comment, The Silenced Citizens: The Post-Garcetti
Landscape for Public Sector Employees Working in National Security, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 759 (2007)
(Garcetti is a particularly bad case for employees in national security, in part because they have few
statutory protections). See, e.g., Martin Schwartz, Eighteenth Annual Supreme Court Review: Section
1983 Civil Rights Litigation in the October 2005 Term, 22 TOURO L. REv. 1033, 1036-37 (2007)
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The Court in Garcetti did not significantly change the way it analyzed
public employees' First Amendment rights; rather, it restated settled
principles on which those claims rest. And in doing so, the decision may
ultimately strengthen the hand of public employees.
This alternative reading of Garcetti requires understanding the case in
its larger context. To that end, this article begins with an overview of the
Court's First Amendment jurisprudence as it evolved from Pickering v.
Board of Education4 to Garcetti. Then, after examining the opinions in
Garcetti and reviewing the lower courts' application of the case, I provide
an alternative reading. This alternative reading has two aspects: (1) I follow
a few lower court opinions and emphasize the narrow and fact-based nature
of the Garcetti ruling; (2) 1 consider how the Court's reliance on theories of
management rights and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine offers
additional protections for public employees.
II.
THE STATE OF THE LAW BEFORE GARCETTI
A. Background
The Supreme Court recognized that public employees retained First
Amendment rights in Pickering v. Board of Education.' But Pickering,
which was decided in 1968 in a period that saw great expansion in First
Amendment protection, was not a departure from the settled doctrine that
individuals did not "relinquish the First Amendment rights they would
otherwise enjoy as citizens" by virtue of their employment by the State.6
Earlier cases had recognized that the State could not refuse to hire or retain
workers based their on First Amendment expression; in Pickering, the
Court ruled that the State could not retaliate against public employees for
(Garcetti case represents "a big setback" for section 1983 litigation); Erwin Chemerinksy, The Rookie
Year of the Roberts Court and A Look Ahead: Civil Rights, 34 PEPP. L. REv. 535, 539 (2007) (Garcetti
"is not only a loss of free speech rights for millions of government employees, but it is really a loss for
the general public, who are much less likely to learn of government misconduct"); Beverley H. Earle
and Gerald A. Madek, The Mirage of Whistleblower Protection Under Sarbanes-Oxley: A Proposal for
Change, 44 AM. BUS. L. J. 1, 17 (2007) ("Although the holding is limited in that it deals with public
employees and the extent of their First Amendment protections, the message [of Garcetti] is still clear.
The newly constituted Supreme Court will not give broad readings to statutes or the Constitution to
undercut [the] government's executive decision-making power and authority."); Paul M. Secunda, More
Than Employees, 30 Legal Times (May 21, 2007), at I (questioning the case's assumptions about public
employment).
4. 391 U.S. at 563.
5. Id. Some of the significant First Amendment cases from the period are New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Tinker v. Des Moines Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), and Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
6. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (citing Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); and Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967)). For the purpose of
this Article, I use "the State" to refer to local, state and federal governments.
2008
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"commenting upon matters of public concern."7  To that end, the Court
declared that the First Amendment protected even false statements by
public employees so long as those statements were not made with knowing
or reckless disregard of their falsity.8
Even at its most expansive, the Supreme Court has never suggested
First Amendment rights were absolute,9 and the decision in Pickering was
no exception. In Pickering, the Court cautioned that public employees'
rights to freedom of expression could be limited by the State's "interests as
an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ
significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the
speech of the citizenry in general."'" In Pickering and the cases that
followed, the Court mapped out the intersection of employee rights and
employer interests.
That balance of rights and interests changed considerably in the forty
years after Pickering. Initially, in Pickering, the Court emphasized the First
Amendment rights of public employees, identifying the variety of ways in
which those rights could be exercised. The Pickering Court held that the
First Amendment protected the speech of a public school teacher who wrote
a letter to the editor protesting a school district's budget allocations.
Subsequent decisions extended the principle to phone calls public
employees made to radio shows," and to comments made on the job in
private conversations (when those comments touched on matters of
community concern). 1" The Court also held that the First Amendment
protected comments made in private to supervisors 3 and statements made
by untenured teachers. 4
In Pickering, the Court suggested that the First Amendment might not
extend to protect false statements when there was evidence that a public
employee knew such statements were false, or made them with reckless
7. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
8. Id. at 574. In Pickering, there was evidence that plaintiffs letter to the editor misreported
some data about the school district budget. Id. at 571. The Court held that even these misstatements
were entitled to First Amendment protection. Id. at 573 (drawing an analogy to the rule set out in
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 254; St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968), and Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S.
374 (1967)).
9. CHEMER[NSKY, supra note 1, at 895.
10. 391 U.S. at 568.
I i. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (involving a call to a radio station
regarding a school dress code).
12. Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1978) (holding that a private
conversation between teacher and principal about school desegregation efforts was entitled to
protection).
13. Id.
14. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1972) (finding that untenured professor has First
Amendment protection, and "lack of contractual or tenure 'right' to re-employment ... is immaterial to
[a] free speech claim"); Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 274 (holding that untenured school teacher's speech
rights are protected).
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disregard for their truth.' 5 Alternatively, there might be some instances
where "the need for confidentiality [was] so great [that] even completely
correct public statements might furnish a permissible ground for
dismissal."'" The Court also suggested that the First Amendment may not
protect some insubordinate remarks, 17 comments that created workplace
disharmony,"8 or public criticisms of an immediate superior that "seriously
undermine[d] the effectiveness of the working relationship."' 9  But
consistent with its focus on protecting speech rights, Pickering emphasized
that there could be no general rule establishing the employer's interests.2"
With its 1982 decision in Connick v. Myers, the Court began to shift its
focus in these cases to protecting public employer interests.2' In Connick,
the Court determined that a questionnaire that a public employee had
prepared and distributed to her co-workers was related to an "employee
grievance" rather than a matter of public concern, and that it was therefore
outside the protections of the First Amendment. The Court emphasized
that the government had a "legitimate purpose in 'promot[ing] efficiency
and integrity in the discharge of official duties and to maintain proper
discipline in the public service. '23
In Rankin v. McPherson, the Court reached a different outcome, but
the First Amendment analysis it relied on stayed the same. 24  After quickly
acknowledging that the plaintiffs remarks (regarding the assassination
attempt on President Reagan) 25 addressed a matter of public concern, 26 the
15. 391 U.S. at 574-75 n.6 ("Because we conclude that [plaintiff's) statements were not
knowingly or recklessly false, we have no occasion to pass upon the additional question whether a
statement that was knowingly or recklessly false would, if it were neither shown nor could be reasonably
be presumed to have had any harmful affects, still be protected by the First Amendment.").
16. Id. at 570 n.3.
17. Id. at 568-69.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 570 n.3. But see 391 U.S. at 574 (citing Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) and
Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962)) ("This Court has also indicated, in more general terms, that
statements by public officials on matters of public concern must be accorded First Amendment
protection despite the fact that the statements are directed at their nominal supervisors.").
20. 391 U.S. at 569.
21. Connick, 461 U.S. at 138.
22. Id. at 147-49 & n.8 (employee grievance distributed to co-workers was not protected). But see
id. at 149 ("One question in [plaintiff's] questionnaire, however, does touch upon a matter of public
concern." The Court found, however, that the employer's interests outweighed the employee's right to
distribute this question to her co-workers during work hours, in the workplace.)
23. Id. at 150-51. Ironically, given the Court's ultimate determination that even the part of the
questionnaire that asked if other employees felt pressured to work on political campaigns was not
entitled to protection, the Court's language about the integrity and efficiency in public service is a quote
from Ex Parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 373 (1882), where the Court upheld a federal law that made it
illegal for public officials to solicit political contributions from public employees.
24. 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
25. Id. at 384-85.
26. Id. at 386. See also id. at 393 (Powell, J., concurring).
2008
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Court turned its attention toward the employer's interests.27 Conceding that
the defendant, a county sheriff, had a particularly strong need to maintain
workplace discipline and public respect, the Court ultimately concluded that
the remarks posed no threat to the employer's interests because the plaintiff
was a clerical worker who made her remarks to a co-worker in an area
inaccessible to the public. 28 The fact-based nature of the decision suggested
that if the plaintiff's job had been more central to the law enforcement role
of the sheriffs office, or her comments more public, the sheriff would have
been more likely to prevail.
The Court's deference to the employer's interests became even more
marked in Waters v. Churchill.29 The Court held that a public employee's
comments criticizing working conditions, made in a private, workplace
conversation with a co-worker, were not protected because the comments
did not address a public concern. That conclusion would have been enough
to distinguish Rankin. However, the plurality staked out a broader claim,
announcing that the government qua employer was entitled to special
deference." Asserting that that the Court's prior rulings "consistently
[gave] greater deference to government predictions of harm used to justify
restriction of employee speech,"'" Justice O'Connor added that "many of
the most fundamental maxims of our First Amendment jurisprudence
cannot reasonably be applied to speech by government employees."32
The Court never made that strong of a statement again; plaintiffs
prevailed in the next public employee speech case. In United States v.
National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), the Court applied Pickering
to strike down an act of Congress that prohibited public employees from
receiving honoraria for speeches and articles they wrote off duty.33 The
majority found for the employees, holding that the government's burden in
justifying such a blanket restriction was greater outside of the work setting,
where the nexus between the speech and the employment relationship was
attenuated. 14
Although a victory for the employees, the Court's opinion in NTEU
reflected post-Connick assumptions: Rather than start from the premise that
a public employee's off-duty speech was entitled to the same First
Amendment protection that was provided for the speech of other private
27. Id. at 388-92.
28. Id. at 390-91.
29. 511 U.S. 661 (1994). Although there was no majority on the other propositions in the case,
five justices agreed that the employee's speech, as characterized above, was not entitled to First
Amendment protection. Id. at 681-82 (plurality consisting of O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsberg, JJ., and
Rehnquist, C.J.); id. at 684 (concurring opinion by Souter, J., joined by Scalia, J.).
30. Id. at 671.
31. Id. at 673.
32. Id. at 672.
33. U.S. v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995) [hereinafter NTELI].
34. Id. at 468-74.
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citizens, the Court reasoned that a public employee was subject to greater
speech limitations than the ordinary citizen, regardless of where that speech
might occur.35 In a subsequent case, the Court extended its Pickering
analysis to independent contractors and assumed that the plaintiffs speech
rights were limited by virtue of his association with the government. 6 By
the turn of the century, the Court had inverted its analysis in public
employee speech cases: in Pickering, the Court started by analyzing the
public employee's protected free speech rights, whereas now the Court
started by analyzing the employer's interests.
B. Creating the Pickering-Connick Test
As the Court shifted its focus to more carefully assess the government
employer's interest in limiting speech, it altered the methods it used to
evaluate these cases. In Pickering, the Court declared that given
the enormous variety of fact situations in which critical statements by...
public employees may be thought by their superiors, against whom the
statements are directed, to furnish grounds for dismissal, we do not deem it
either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard
against which all such statements may be judged.37
The Supreme Court directed lower courts to engage in a case-by-case
inquiry that balanced the citizen-employee's interest in speaking on matters
of public concern against the government employer's interest in "promoting
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees."38
For a decade after Pickering, the Court treated that balancing of
interests as something less than a formal test, and described the required
inquiry several different ways. In Mt. Healthy v. Doyle, the Court cast its
inquiry as a shifting burden of proof: the burden was initially on the
plaintiff to show that constitutionally protected speech was the "substantial
factor" that prompted the government's action.39 Once that was done, the
burden shifted to the government to establish "by a preponderance of the
35. Id. at 468-69. Accord San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77 (2004) (per curiam) (holding that police
department could fire officer who appeared in pornographic film wearing identifiable police insignia;
the Court concluded that because the employee's on-camera activities did not relate to a matter of public
concern he failed to meet the first part of the Pickering balancing test); cf NTEU, 513 U.S. at 481-82
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
36. Bd. of County Comm'r v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 673 (1996).
37. 391 U.S. at 569.
38. The balance that had to be struck was articulated in Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568, and was
defined as a two-step test in Connick, 461 U.S. at 142. After Connick it was usually characterized as a
two-step test. See, e.g., Roe, 543 U.S. at 82. But see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 1071-72
(characterizing it as a three-step burden of proof). Accord Sheppard v. Beerman, 317 F.3d 351, 355 (2d
Cir. 2003) (articulating a three-part burden of proof test).
39. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287. Cf Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 598 (1972) (citing
Pickering for the proposition that "a teacher's public criticism of his superiors on matters of public
concern may be constitutionally protected, and may, therefore, be an impermissible basis for
termination" without reference to a balancing test).
2008
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evidence that it would have reached the same decision... even in the absence
of the protected conduct."4
A few years later, in Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School
District,4' the Court tweaked the Pickering balance, creating different tests
that varied with the context of the speech. The Court declared that when a
public employee "speaks publicly, it is generally the content of his
statements that must be assessed to determine whether they 'in any way
impeded [his] proper performance of his daily duties... or interfered with the
regular operation of [his workplace] generally."' 42  This narrow inquiry
increased the likelihood that an employee's speech would be protected.
However, the majority in Givhan went on to hold that when an employee
speaks privately (for example, when he "personally confront[s] his
immediate superior"), the risk to the public employer increases; the
employer's "institutional efficiency may be threatened not only by the
content of the employee's message, but also by the manner, time and place
in which it is delivered."43 This sort of private statement should therefore
prompt a more extensive inquiry into the possible harm to the public
employer's interests. That deeper inquiry, in turn, increases the likelihood
that the employee's speech would be denied protection.
Connick turned Pickering's flexible balancing of interests into a rigid
two-step test and, in so doing, changed the very nature of the inquiry.44 The
Court declared that the first question was whether the employee's speech
was regarding a matter of public concern. This was a threshold issue; if
there was a finding that the employee's speech was not on a matter of
public concern, the inquiry ended and First Amendment protections were
40. Id. In Waters v. Churchill, a majority of the Court ruled that the defendant could meet its
burden by showing what it reasonably believed the employee's speech to be, as opposed to what it was.
511 U.S. 661, 679-80 (1994) (plurality opinion); id. at 686 (concurring justices express a similar view).
There was, however, no majority on the issue of whether a plaintiff could rebut this evidence. Compare
id. at 681 (plurality opinion) (concluding that a plaintiff could rebut this evidence and defeat a motion
for summary judgment) with id. at 689-90 (Souter, J., concurring) (arguing that this should not be the
rule).
41. 439 U.S. 410(1979).
42. Id. at 415 n.4 (emphasis in original).
43. Id.
44. The Supreme Court never explained how this balancing test intersected with the burden of
proof it outlined in Mt. Healthy. As a result, the lower courts have used a variety of standards. Some
concluded that the Pickering-Connick balance went to the first and second steps of the Mt. Healthy
examination. See Aikens v. Fulton County, Ga., 420 F.3d 1293, 1303-04 (11 th Cir. 2005). Others have
held that it went to a later part of a burden of proof analysis. See Belk v. City of Eldon, 228 F.3d 872
(8th Cir. 2000). Some courts turned to Connick to make a determination about whether the speech was
protected by the First Amendment, and then applied the Pickering balancing test. See Brochu v. City of
Riviera Beach, 304 F.3d 1144, 1157 (11 th Cir. 2002). Some courts emphasized protecting employee
speech. See Roth v. Veterans Admin. of U.S., 856 F.2d 1401, 1406 (9th Cir. 1988). Others emphasized
the harm to the employer. See Bowman v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 723 F.2d 640, 644 (8th
Cir. 1983) (listing six factors to consider in a public employee speech case, starting with harm to the
employer).
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denied.45 As it discussed this step, the Connick Court also altered the way it
analyzed employee speech. In Givhan, the Court noted that "the First
Amendment's protection of government employees extends to private as
well as public expression," but added that the two types of speech had to be
assessed differently. Public statements should be assessed in terms of their
content, to determine if they impeded the employee's performance of her
duties or interfered with the regular operation of the agency. Because of the
risk they posed to institutional efficiency, private one-on-one conversations
between a public employee and a supervisor had to be subject to additional
scrutiny, which took into account the content of the speech and the
"manner, time and place in which it [was] delivered."46  By contrast, in
Connick, the Court declared that its assessment of whether the plaintiffs
questionnaire was entitled to First Amendment protection depended not
only on its content, but also on the "manner, time, and place in which [it]
was distributed. 47  With that step, Connick collapsed the two types of
speech identified in Givhan into one. This decision thus indicated the
Court's increased attention to the public employer's interests.48
In yet another shift, the Connick Court ruled that the issue of whether a
public employee spoke on a matter of public concern was a question of law
rather than fact. 49 This meant that any determination about the nature of the
public employee's speech would be reviewed de novo. As the majority put
it, "we are compelled to examine for ourselves the statements in issue and
the circumstances under which they [were] made to see whether or not
they... are of a character which the principles of the First Amendment...
protect."50
The second step of the Connick test also altered the inquiry into the
employer's conduct. In Pickering, the Court indicated that speech that
undermined the employer's ability to perform its public function, was
directly insubordinate, or caused serious conflict, might merit dismissal."
45. Connick, 461 U.S. at 149. In Connick, the Court ruled that part of the questionnaire was on a
matter of public concern, and that with respect to that question the second step of the test had to be
engaged. Id. ("One question in Myers' questionnaire, however, does touch upon a matter of public
concern.... Because one of the questions in Meyer's survey touched upon a matter of public concern,
and contributed to her discharge we must determine whether Connick was justified in discharging
Myers.") But cf San Diego, 543 U.S. at 83 (2004) ("[qinding that-with the exception of the final
question-the questionnaire touched not on matters of public concern but on internal workplace
grievances, the Court held no Pickering balancing was required [in Connick].").
46. Givhan, 439 U.S. at 415 & n.4.
47. Connick, 461 U.S. at 152-153. The Court left open the possibility that comments made at the
workplace, but outside the work area, or during "non-work" time (such as lunch) might be treated
differently. Id. at 153 n. 13.
48. See discussion supra notes 40-41.
49. Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n.7. The Court repeated this point, citing Connick, in Rankin v.
McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 385-86 (1987).
50. Id. at 150 n. 10 (quoting Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946).
51. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569-70 & n.3.
2008
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By contrast, in Connick, the Court declared that any employee statement
that interfered with a close working relationship was presumptively
disruptive and grounds for termination.5 2  The Court added that it was
appropriate to give "a wide degree of deference" to the employer's
assessment that a particular statement posed potential harm to the
workplace. "
In Rankin v. McPherson, the Court retreated slightly, indicating that it
was inappropriate to defer to the employer's assessment of harm when an
employee's private statement was related to an obvious matter of public
concern. 4 But the Court reiterated that reviewing courts had the power and
the duty to evaluate the evidence relating to each step in the Pickering-
Connick balancing test de novo.55
Then a few years later, in Waters v. Churchill, the Court reasserted
Connick's strong claim for the primacy of the employer's interests.
Although it was a plurality decision, a majority of the justices agreed that
when determining whether an employee's remarks disrupted a workplace, a
court should ask only what the employer reasonably believed the employee
said.6 There was no need to determine the actual content of the
employee's remarks.57 The plurality went on to declare that the employer's
interest in "effectively" achieving its goals justified restrictions on
employee speech."8
In Pickering, the Court emphasized that public employee rights to
speak trumped the interests of public employers. By the middle of the
1990s, the Court had reweighed that balance, deferring to the interests of
public employers at the expense of protecting the rights of public
employees.
C. The Larger First Amendment Context
The Court's increasing willingness to subordinate public employee
speech rights to the government's interests as an employer led the Court to
52. Connick, 461 U.S. at 151-52. Later in its opinion, the Court went further and suggested that
Connick was entitled to discipline Myers because her statements carried "the clear potential for
undermining office relations." Id. at 152. That suggests that any remark that undermined the morale of
co-workers could be grounds for termination.
53. Id- The Court emphasized that the employer could act to prevent possible disruption, stating
"we do not see the necessity for an employer to allow events to unfold to the extent that the disruption of
the office and the destruction of working relationships is manifest . . ." The Court added that less
deference might be appropriate where the "employee's speech more substantially involved a matter of
public concern." Id.
54. See 483 U.S. at 388 n. 13 (referring to the concurring opinion by Justice Powell. Id. at 392-94.)
55. See id. at 388-92. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 150.
56. This includes the plurality plus the justices who joined Justice Souter's concurring opinion.
57. Waters, 511 U.S. at 677-78 (citing the related passages in the concurring opinion).
58. Id. at 674-75 (offering as an example the case of a governor who legitimately fired an
employee because he "justifiably [felt] that a quieter subordinate would let [the staff] do [their] job more
effectively").
HeinOnline  -- 29 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 184 2008
2008 EMPLOYEE SPEECH & MANAGEMENT RIGHTS
reposition public employee speech claims with respect to two other areas of
First Amendment law: the unconstitutional conditions doctrine59 and
restrictions on political patronage.6"
1. Shifts in the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine
In Pickering, the Court used the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as
a basis for its holding that a government employer could not retaliate
against a public employee for speech.6 The doctrine provides that the
government "cannot condition a benefit on the requirement that a person
forego a constitutional right,"62 or "deny a benefit to a person because he
exercises a constitutional right."63 The Court reaffirmed that doctrine as the
foundation of public employee speech cases in Perry v. Sindermann64 and
again in Connick v. Myers.65 But for more than a decade after Connick, the
Court dropped the unconstitutional conditions doctrine from its analysis.6 6
The disappearance of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in public
employee speech cases mirrored a change in the Court's broader treatment
of the doctrine during the 1980s.67 Discussions of the doctrine in the 1960s
59. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 534-35, 946-47. Chemerinsky emphasizes the
First Amendment aspect of the doctrine, id. at 946-50, though others have argued that the doctrine
extends beyond the First Amendment; see, e.g., Richard Epstein, Forward: Unconstitutional
Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1989). For an example of the
doctrine extending beyond the First Amendment, see Adam Liptak, Full Constitutional Protection for
Some, but No Privacy for the Poor, N.Y.TIMES, July 16, 2007, at A9 (discussing public benefits for the
poor conditioned on relinquishing Fourth Amendment and privacy rights). Here, I am only interested in
developments that relate to the First Amendment.
60. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 1076-77.
61. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (citing Wieman, 344 U.S. at 183; Shelton, 364 U.S. at 479;
Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 589).
62. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 946.
63. Id. at 946 (quoting Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983)).
64. 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). But see Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 284 and Givhan, 439 U.S. at 414
(in both cases the Court assumed that public employees retained First Amendment rights, and merely
cited Pickering to assert that general premise without reference to the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine).
65. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147 ("Our responsibility is to ensure that citizens are not deprived of
fundamental rights by virtue of working for the government .... ")
66. See, e.g., Rankin, 483 U.S. at 383 (asserting simply that public employee's have some First
Amendment rights (citing Perry, 408 U.S. at 593), and examines whether the employer's right in this
case trumped to employee's right); Waters, 511 U.S. at 674-76 (discussing extensively the reasons why
a government employer may restrict speech but omitting any discussion of unconstitutional conditions
doctrine); NTEU, 513 U.S. at 468-69 (analyzing the limits on Congressional power to enact legislation
that restricts the First Amendment rights of public employees in terms of viewpoint discrimination); San
Diego, 543 U.S. at 80 (2004) (focusing on government-employer's power to limit employee speech).
67. The Court's shifts with respect to the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is a classic example
of how the Court's membership matters. In the early years, the Court's treatment of the doctrine was
shaped by Justice Brennan, who wrote many of the relevant cases. From 1980-1992, when the Court
retrenched in this area, its opinions were frequently authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist. The Court
returned to a more expansive view of the doctrine in 1992; these recent decisions have been written by
Justice Kennedy.
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and 1970s emphasized its importance in preventing the government from
inducing orthodoxy in thought by imposing unconstitutional conditions.68
Those cases echoed,69 and at times explicitly invoked,7" Justice Jackson's
attack on government-sponsored orthodoxy in West Virginia State Board of
Education v Barnette.7' Jackson explained that such conditions were
unconstitutional because they compelled speech of a particular sort and
silenced contrary points of view.72
During the 1980s, the Court began to explore the possibility that the
government could condition funding or receipt of other benefits on the
agreement that its recipients would only advance a particular point of view.
Just after Connick, the Court held in Regan v. Taxation with Representation
that Congress could condition tax exempt status on the promise that groups
will not engage in lobbying.73 Then in Rust v. Sullivan,74 the Court upheld
a federal law that barred doctors employed at federally-subsidized family
planning clinics from advocating abortions or recommending abortion
providers. The Court indicated that the government could use its funding
powers to silence particular points of view, in effect encouraging
orthodoxy.
Although Rust appeared to mark the end of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine, its broad reach was quickly limited. In 1995, the Court
reaffirmed its commitment to the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in
Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, which struck down a public
university's funding scheme because it denied money to student groups that
advanced religious ideas.75 The Court explained that Rust stood only for
the proposition that "when the government appropriates public funds to
promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it wishes."76
Harking back to the fear of orthodoxy expressed in its earlier cases, the
Rosenberger Court held that the university's funding rules endangered
"[v]ital First Amendment principles" by "granting to the State the power to
examine publications to determine whether or not they are based on some
68. See, e.g., Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 602-03, 606-07; Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1976)
(Brennan, J., plurality).
69. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 606-07.
70. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 514 (1980).
71. 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
72. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 602-03. Accord Branti, 445 U.S. at 514.
73. Regan, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
74. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991).
75. 515 U.S. 819, 846 (1995).
76. Id. at 833 (citing Rust, 500 U.S. at 194, 196-200) (the Court added that when the government
"disperses public funds to private entities to convey a governmental message, it may take legitimate and
appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee.")
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ultimate idea" and to restrict some because they advanced disfavored
ideas. "
The Court then repeated its commitment to the older understanding of
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in Legal Services v. Velazquez,
striking down an act of Congress that provided that legal services lawyers
who received federal funding could not challenge the constitutionality of
welfare laws to which their clients were subjected." The Court again read
Rust narrowly, noting that the federal law at issue in that case "did not
single out a particular idea for suppression because it was dangerous or
disfavored; rather, Congress prohibited [covered] doctors from counseling
that was outside the scope of the project."79 Although the funded doctors in
the family planning centers could not discuss abortions, others were
permitted to do so. Even the funded doctors could provide abortion
information to their clients in other settings.8" In Velazquez, by contrast, the
Court reasoned that the restriction on legal services lawyers would silence a
particular point of view relating to the constitutionality of welfare laws.
This would harm the lawyers' clients irreparably and deprive the legal
system of access to particular arguments.8'
The Court's return to a more traditional view of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine briefly influenced its public sector free speech cases.
The year after Rosenberger was decided, the Court relied on the doctrine in
County Board v. Umbehr to conclude that the owner of a private company
contracting with the government to provide services retained First
Amendment rights.82 But the reference was brief and the doctrine's
application to an independent contractor did little to clarify whether the
Court continued to believe that public employment could not be
conditioned on restrictions of First Amendment rights. In this vacuum,
some lower courts ruled that salaries were a form of funding that allowed
government employers the right to demand employees advance only
particular points of view. 83
77. Id. at 835. The Court added that in a university setting this was particularly dangerous. See
also Univ. of Wis. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000) (holding that Wisconsin's funding policies
should be upheld precisely because they encouraged expression of a wide range of ideas).
78. 531 U.S. 533, 549 (2001).
79. Id. at 540.
80. Id. at 542-43. The Court distinguished these circumstances from the situation in which the
clients found themselves in Velazquez, where there were no alternative avenues for pressing the
prohibited arguments.
81. Id.at533-34.
82. Unmbehr, 518 U.S. at 674-75 (the Court, in determining whether an independent contractor had
First Amendment rights, began assessment with reference to unconstitutional conditions doctrine).
83. See. e.g., Mayers v. Monroe County, 474 F.3d 477, 479 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Piggee v. Carl
Sandburg College, 464 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2006); Webster v. New Lenox School District No. 122,
917 F.2d 1004 (7th Cir. 1990).
2008
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2. Moving away from a Parallel
In Connick,84 the Court drew a parallel between the rights protected by
Pickering and the right to be free from political coercion, which it had
recognized in Elrod v. Burns85 and Branti v. Finkel.86 There were obvious
connections between the two lines of cases. In Branti, the Court relied on
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, declaring that a patronage plan that
conditioned the employment of two public defenders on their membership
in the Democratic Party violated the First Amendment because it imposed a
political orthodoxy on public employees.87 The Court added that "[i]f the
First Amendment protects a public employee from discharge based on what
he has said, it must also protect him for what he believes."88 Subsequent
cases reaffirmed the close connection between these lines of cases. In
Rutan v. Republican Party, the Court extended the prohibition against
conditioning employment on political affiliation to promotions, transfers,
recalls, and other employment practices.89 In the process, it repeated that
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine was at the heart of the holdings in
the patronage cases,90 and again noted that a public employee could not be
fired for her speech or her political beliefs.91
But the Court weakened the relationship between these two lines of
cases in O'Hare Truck Service v. City of Northlake.92 Although the Court
held that independent contractors could not lose their state contracts for
their political beliefs-noting once again the connection between the
Pickering-Connick and Elrod-Branti cases-the Court declared in dicta that
there were differences between these two types of cases.93 In patronage
cases, where employment was conditioned "on the raw test of political
affiliation," evidence of the demand for political affiliation "sufficed to
show a constitutional violation, without the necessity of an inquiry any
more detailed than asking whether the [political] requirement was
reasonable for the employee in question."94  The Court contrasted that
situation with public employee speech cases, where there was a greater
possibility that the employer had a legitimate reason to restrict an
84. Connick, 461 U.S. at 142 (1983) (citing Brand, 445 U.S. at 515-16 for the proposition that "a
State could not condition public employment on a basis that infringed the employee's constitutionally
protected interest in freedom of expression.").
85. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 347 (1976).
86. Branti, 445 U.S. at 507.
87. Id. at 514 (citing Barnette, 319 U.S. at 624) (noting that the First Amendment existed to
oppose orthodoxy).
88. Id. at 515.
89. 497 U.S. 62 (1990).
90. Id. at 69, 74.
91. Id. at 69.
92. 518 U.S. 712 (1996).
93. Id. at 716-17 (citing, inter alia, Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 589 and Pickering, 391 U.S. at 563).
94. Id. at 719.
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employee's speech.95  Although the Pickering-Connick balancing test
allowed for an inquiry into the employer's motive, it reasoned that inquiry
should give greater leeway to the employer's justification than would be
proper in a patronage case.96
As this suggests, by the start of the 21st century, the logic of the
Court's public employee free speech cases had changed considerably. No
longer did it emphasize carving out a narrow workplace exception to
general First Amendment rights. The Court had become more concerned
with expanding the power of public employers to restrict employee
speech.97 To that end, it had replaced Pickering's balancing of interests
with a two-step test, and had drawn a distinction between public employee
speech cases and political patronage decisions. What was less clear was the
extent to which the old theory of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine,
with its emphasis on restraining the government's power to impose
orthodoxy, continued to shape the Court's understanding of public
employee speech rights.
III.
CEBALLOS v. GARCETTI
In February 2000, Richard Ceballos, a calendar deputy in the Pomona
office of the District Attorney for Los Angeles, was approached by a
defense attorney during a court call.98 The defense attorney advised
Ceballos that he believed that the warrant used against his client in the
pending case was based on a perjured affidavit and asked Ceballos to look
into the situation. 99
Ceballos agreed to do so and obtained the file from a more junior
deputy district attorney handling the case.' 00 He read through the materials
in the file, including the search warrant and supporting affidavit, reviewed
photos and a video tape of the area that had been searched and then went to
95. Id. (extending this principle to hybrid cases where "specific instances of the employee's
speech or expression ... are intertwined with a political affiliation requirement").
96. Id. But cf Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006), a Bivens action decided a few months
before Garcetti. Emphasizing the precise nature of the pleading and proof of causation that was
necessary in a Bivens claim, 126 S.Ct. at 1703-04, the Court compared that with the less stringent proof
required in Pickering actions, where causation was inferred from "evidence of the motive and the
discharge." Id. at 1703.
97. In this, the Court's opinions reflected general workplace law trends. See Carol Hymowitz,
Personal Boundaries Shrink as Companies Punish Bad Behavior, WALL ST. J., June 18, 2007, at B I
(noting that off duty misconduct is increasingly grounds for discipline, including termination, regardless
of rank).
98. Joint Appendix, Volume I at *30, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006) (No. 04-473),
2004 U.S. Briefs 473 [hereinafter J.A.l, at *_J; Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1170-71 (9th Cir.
2004).
99. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28038, at *3.
100. Garcetti, 361 F.3d at 1171 (Garcetti supervised the more junior deputy attorney).
2008
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the property.'' When his investigations suggested that the affidavit rested
on significant misrepresentations, he contacted the deputy sheriff who had
prepared it.' 1 2  The officer advised Ceballos that he had no personal
knowledge of the scene and had relied on the statements of two other
deputy sheriffs.0 3 Ceballos then discussed the affidavit with the other
deputy attorneys general and with his supervisors.",o As the Ninth Circuit
found, "[e]veryone agreed that the validity of the warrant was
questionable."105
The problem of the warrant's validity was hardly abstract. Aside from
the obvious ethical and constitutional problems posed by a perjured
affidavit,'06 the situation was complicated by circumstances in Los Angeles
in February 2000. For the previous 18 months, a series of incidents had
exposed misconduct by the Los Angeles Police Department. 107 In
September 1999, one officer charged with misconduct entered a plea
agreement that revealed a sustained pattern of police abuse and misconduct
in the Rampart Division of the Police Department. His revelations gave rise
101. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28038, at *32, *34.
102. Id. at *34-35. The warrant described a search for a stolen car that began when officers saw
suspicious tire tracks going up a long driveway; the tire tracks led to a house and yard and a search of
the premises turned up drugs. Id. at *32-34. Ceballos' investigation revealed that the driveway was
actually a paved common road that could not show tire tracks. Id. at *34.
103. Id. at *36-37.
104. Id. at *39; Garcetti, 361 F.3d at 1171.
105. Garcetti, 361 F.3d at 1171.
106. See also L.A. COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, LEGAL POLICIES MANUAL 1-7 (1998)
(directing prosecutors to evaluate whether witnesses will fabricate or provide mistaken evidence); Erwin
Chemerinsky, An Independent Analysis of the Los Angeles Police Department's Board of Inquiry Report
on the Rampart Scandal, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 545, 635 (2001) [hereinafter Chemerinsky, Independent
Analysis] (discussing the Legal Policies Manual); Brief of Ass'n of Deputy Dist. Attorneys and Cal.
Prosecutors Ass'n as Amici Curiae In Support of Respondent, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006)
(No. 04-473).
107. David W. Burcham and Catherine L. Fisk, Symposium: The Rampart Scandal: Policing the
Criminal Justice System: Introduction, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 537, 537-38 (2001); RAMPART
INDEPENDENT REVIEW PANEL, REPORT OF THE RAMPART INDEPENDENT REVIEW PANEL at 3-4
[hereinafter INDEPENDENT REVIEW] (2000), http: //www.lacity.org/ oig/rirprpt.pdf. There were other
reasons to be concerned about evidence in Pomona. Blair v. City of Pomona, 223 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir.
2000) (First Amendment claim by police officer, alleging he was retaliated against because he blew the
whistle on misconduct in the city police department). The problem was not confined to California;
following several stories revealing evidence that exonerated some of the men on Illinois' Death Row, on
January 31, 2000, Illinois Governor George Ryan declared a moratorium on the death penalty and
created a special task force to investigate death penalty prosecutions in Illinois. See Illinois Suspends
the Death Penalty, CNN, Jan. 31, 2000, http: //archives.cnn.com/ 2000/US/01/3 l/illinois.executions.02/
(last visited May 19, 2007). Three years later, as he left office, Ryan commuted all death penalty
sentences. Two years later, that task force presented its report. Report on Governor's Commission on
Capital Punishment (Apr. 2002), available at http: //www.state.il.us/defender/ccpr.html. See also
Richard Moran, The Presence of Malice, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2007, at A21 (summarizing report that
found widespread falsification and manipulation of evidence in criminal prosecutions throughout the
country).
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to the Rampart Scandal, which led to the overturning of more than 100
convictions. 1
8
Ceballos may not have known the full extent of the Rampart Scandal in
February 2000 because the first investigatory report on the problem was not
released until March 1, 2000, and because the scandal did not touch the Los
Angeles Sheriff's Department. 10 9 But the Los Angeles law enforcement
problems were in the air as Ceballos considered what to do about the
warrant.
At least initially, it seemed as though others in the Office of the
District Attorney shared Ceballos' concerns. "0 Ceballos understood that
his supervisors planned to dismiss the charges in the case. Accordingly, on
March 2, 2000, he prepared a disposition memo for his supervisor's review,
in which he outlined why he believed the affidavit was based on false
evidence, and recommended dismissal."' At his supervisor's request,
Ceballos revised the memorandum so that it was "less accusatory.""' 2
108. INDEPENDENT REVIEW, supra note 107, at 4-5. See generally Burcham & Fisk, supra note
107, at 537.
109. Los ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, BOARD OF INQUIRY INTO THE RAMPART AREA
CORRUPTION INCIDENT PUBLIC REPORT, (Mar. 1, 2000), available at http: // www.lapdonline.org/
assets/pdf/boi-pub.pdf (last visited May 19, 2007). For a criticism of the analysis and conclusions in
that report, see Chemerinsky, Independent Analysis, supra note 106. A second, more critical report,
prepared by an Independent Review Board for the City of Los Angeles, was published shortly thereafter.
REPORT OF THE RAMPART INDEPENDENT REVIEW PANEL (Nov. 16, 2000) available at http: //
www.lacity.org/oig/rirprpt.pdf (last visited May 19, 2007). The City of Los Angeles entered into a
Consent Decree with the Department of Justice as a result of the scandal, and prepares annual reports
outlining the LAPD's compliance. The Consent Decree and reports are available at http: //
www.lapdonline.org/consent_decree. Cf J.A.l at 81 (Ceballos testified that everyone knew of the
problems of police misconduct that arose in the Perez case, part of the Rampart Scandal).
But see Human Rights Watch, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN
THE UNITED STATES at 71 n.2 (July 1, 1999) (reporting that some believed that the LA sheriffs were
more brutal than the LAPD), available at http: H www.hrw.org/reports98/police/uspo7 I.htm (last visited
Aug. 22, 2007).
110. Garcetti, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28039, at *3 (everyone agreed that there were problems with
the warrant). Cf Chemerinsky, Independent Analysis, supra note 106 at 632-33 (criticizing the office of
the Los Angeles District Attorney for lacking procedures to evaluate Brady requests or perjured
testimony). See also Moran, supra note 107; Adam Liptak, Federal Judge Files Complaint Against
Prosecutor in Boston, N.Y.TIMES, July 3, 2007, at All (article on federal judge who filed complaint
against federal prosecutor asserting the prosecutor failed to turn over evidence to the defense); Adam
Liptak, Prosecutor Becomes Prosecuted, NYTIMES June 24, 2007, at Sec. 4 (discussion of
prosecutorial misconduct, including Brady issues, in the context of the Nifong case in North Carolina).
Cf Transcript Oral Argument, Mar. 21, 2005, at 59-60 (colloquy between Ceballos' attorney and
Supreme Court justices regarding whether there are problems with prosecutors being afraid to raise
questions about prosecutions).
111. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28039, *3-4; J.A.I at *20-21; Garcetti, 361 F.3d at. 1171. The
Rampart Scandal must have been on the minds of all concerned by this point; Ceballos presented the
memo to his supervisor on March 2, 2000, the day after the Police Board of Inquiry's report on the
scandal came out. Id. at 1171.
112. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28039, at *4; J.A.I at *41-42.
HeinOnline  -- 29 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 191 2008
192 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW Vol. 29:1
Based on that memo and his understanding of the facts, Ceballos'
supervisor authorized the defendant's release. 3
A little over a week later, Ceballos, his two supervisors, and
representatives of the Los Angeles Sheriffs Office met to discuss the
memorandum and the underlying case. t"4 This meeting changed things.
Ceballos' memo had enraged the Sheriffs representatives, who denounced
him for acting like "a public defender.""' 5 They also expressed concern that
a dismissal would provoke the defendants to sue the Sheriffs office." 6
Persuaded by that reaction,"' Ceballos' supervisors allowed the case to go
to trial in the hope that the courts could properly adjudicate the reliability of
the affidavit."'
When the case was not dismissed, one defense attorney filed a motion
for a traverse to challenge the warrant, and called Ceballos as a witness." 9
Ceballos notified his supervisors and advised them that he believed he had
an obligation to turn over his disposition memo. '20 One supervisor initially
directed Ceballos to prepare a new, shorter version of his original memo,
but he convinced her that it would be more appropriate to turn over a
redacted version of the memo. 2'
At the hearing, '22 Ceballos was cross-examined by a supervisor, '23 who
managed to limit Ceballos' testimony through evidentiary objections.'2 4
113. Id. at *54-55; Transcript Oral Argument, Mar. 21, 2005, at 55 ("The employer sided with
[Ceballos] initially and released the defendant ....").
114. J.A.I at *27; 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28039, at *4.
115. J.A.I at *45.
116. Id. at *49 (they added that one of the defendants had sued in an earlier case).
117. Garcetti, 361 F.3d at 1171. The decision may also have been influenced by political concerns.
Gil Garcetti, the District Attorney for Los Angeles, was up for re-election in 2000, and in March of that
year, his opponents already were using the Rampart Scandal against him during the campaign. See, e.g.
Scott C. Smith, Groveman, Cooley Blast Garcetti over Rampart, METROPOLITAN NEWS COMPANY, LOS
ANGELES, February 18, 2000, at 3 (opponents attack Garcetti for his handling of the Rampart Scandal
during election event). Cf J.A.I at *84-86 (Mexican American Bar Association expresses concern that
Ceballos' complaints might become a campaign issue); id. at *98 (one of the individual defendants
charged that Ceballos was making his claims to help Garcetti's opponent in the upcoming election). See
generally Mitchell Landsberg, Garcetti Far Behind in Race for Third Term, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2000,
at Al (Garcetti's poll results reflect anger over Rampart Scandal); Mitchell Landsberg and Twila
Decker, Los Angeles District Attorney: Colley Beats Garcetti by a Wide Margin, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8,
2000, at Al (quoting campaign officials as suggesting that the Rampart Scandal helped lead to Garcetti's
defeat); Barbara Whitaker, Rocky Tenure Ends for Los Angeles Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES Nov. 10, 2000,
at A 18 (quoting Steve Cooley, who defeated Garcetti in election, as suggesting that the Rampart
Scandal was the main reason Garcetti lost).
118. J.A.I at *50-51.
119. Id. at *53-54.
120. Id. at *54-55.
121. Id. at *55-57; Joint Appendix, Volume II, at *419 [hereinafter JA.Il].
122. J.A.Il at *158.
123. J.A.l at *61-62. Ceballos testified that the presiding judge at the hearing told him that the
cross examination was harsh. Id. at *87.
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Ultimately, the judge rejected the motion for a traverse and the criminal
case proceeded.' 5
Ceballos claimed that he had suffered retaliation at work as a result of
his statements about the warrant affidavit, which culminated in his transfer
to a less prestigious job. 126 He protested this treatment in a variety of ways:
he brought a grievance2 7 and asked the Mexican American Lawyers
Association to intervene with his supervisors on his behalf.'28 When those
routes failed, he filed a lawsuit, claiming that he had been retaliated against
for exercising his First Amendment rights in violation of the Pickering-
Connick line of cases. 1
29
A. In the Lower Courts
Ceballos' claims never made it to trial. In an unpublished opinion, the
District Court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment on
Ceballos' federal claims. 3 ' After first ruling that the First Amendment
claim rested solely on Ceballos' March 2 memo, the court concluded that
the memo "clearly involved a matter of public concern," but added that
because Ceballos "wrote [it] as part of his job,"'' the memo was not
protected. 
32
124. J.A.Il, at *296-300; cited in Brief of Ass'n of Deputy Dist. Attorneys and Cal. Prosecutors
Ass'n as Amici Curiae In Support of Respondent at *7, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (No. 04-473),
2004 U.S. Briefs 473.
125. After the hearing on the motion for a traverse, Ceballos notified one of his supervisors that he
felt he had an obligation to turn information over to the defense under Brady. J.A.l at *89-90. He was
told not to do so, and that he could be sued if he did. Id. at *90, 93. The record is not clear about
whether he did so or not. One amicus brief filed with the Supreme Court argued that Ceballos' did turn
over the material, and should have been fired for doing so. Brief of the Nat'l Ass'n of Counties et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 15 n.8, Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 410 (No. 04-473), 2004 U.S. Briefs
473. But as another amicus brief points out, that issue was not before the Court. Brief of Ass'n of
Deputy Dist. Attorneys and California Prosecutors Ass'n as Amici Curiae In Support of Respondent at
18 n.8, Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 410 (No. 04-473), 2004 U.S. Briefs 473.
126. 2002 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 28039, at *6. Cf Chemerinsky, Independent Analysis, supra note 106,
at 638 (stating: "prosecutors [in the office of the Los Angeles District Attorney] are afraid of being
blackballed or labeled by officers and supervisors, who challenge their assessments [concerning perjured
or tainted evidence]").
127. J.A.l at *82-83.
128. Id. at *84-85.
129. Garcetti, 361 F.3d at 1172. Ceballos also brought a common law claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Second Amended Complaint, paragraphs 32-34; J.A.I at * 146-47.
130. There were two motions for summary judgment. The first was filed on behalf of the
individual defendants; the second on behalf of the county and the District Attorney, in his official
capacity. The District Court granted the first motion on the ground that the individual defendants were
entitled to qualified immunity, Garcetti, No. CV 00-11106 AHM (AJWx), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
28039, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2002), and the second on the ground that the county and District
Attorney were entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. Garcetti, 361 F.3d at
1170.
131. Garcetti, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28039, at *15-16.
132. Id. at *17-18.
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In support of that conclusion, the District Court relied on a Sevtnth
Circuit decision, Gonzales v. City of Chicago.'33 The plaintiff in that case,
a newly recruited police officer, claimed that his colleagues retaliated
against him for the reports he had written during his previous job as an
investigator of police misconduct at the Office of Professional Standards
(OPS). The Seventh Circuit ruled that the plaintiff was not entitled to First
Amendment protection because he had written the reports as part of his
job. '34 Yet the court limited the reach of its ruling:
If Gonzales were writing reports of police misconduct, and his supervisors
told him to rewrite the reports so as not to disclose police corruption,
Gonzales would have a First Amendment right to expose the police cover-
up to the public. But in that circumstance, Gonzalez would be acting
beyond his employment capacity. Instead of simply performing his job of
writing truthful, internal reports, he would be speaking as a citizen on a
matter of public concem-a police cover-up.' 35
In light of that caveat, the district court's conclusion that Gonzales
supported a ruling against Ceballos seems misguided; but ultimately, the
district court's discussion of Gonzales was dicta. That court determined
that it was not clear whether work-related statements were entitled to First
Amendment protection, and granted summary judgment on the ground that
the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. '3 6
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed with a 2-1 majority holding that
Ceballos' "allegations of wrongdoing in the memorandum constitute[d]
protected speech under the First Amendment...."' 3 7 The court conceded that
the First Amendment rights of public employees on the job were not
absolute, but it determined nonetheless that Ceballos' speech was protected
under the analysis developed by the Supreme Court in Pickering and
elaborated in Connick. 3 ' The majority found that Ceballos' memorandum
133. 239 F.3d 939 (7th Cir. 2001).
134. Id.at941.
135. Id. The Seventh Circuit clarified the limits of Gonzales in Delgado v. Jones, 282 F.3d 511
(7th Cir. 2001) by extending First Amendment protection to an employee who suffered retaliation after
he reported misconduct to supervisors. The court explained: "Our holding in Gonzales is limited to
routine discharge of assigned functions, where there is no suggestion of public motivation. In the case
now before the court, [plaintiff's] communications with his superiors were designed not only to convey
information of possible crimes, but also additional facts that were relevant to the manner and scope of
any subsequent investigation." Id. at 518-19.
136. Garcetti, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28093, at *20-22 (having granted summary judgment on
Ceballos' constitutional claim, the district court declined to exercise jurisdiction over his remaining state
law claim.).
137. Garcetti, 361 F.3d at 1173. The court declined to reach the question of whether his other
communications were protected, noting that the parties did not agree about the scope of Ceballos'
communications. Id. at 1172-73. The court ruled that it need only consider the memorandum, about
which the parties did agree, and that question of the nature and extent of Ceballos' other
communications was best addressed at trial.
138. Id. at 1173.
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addressed a matter of public concern. 39 Applying several decades of Ninth
Circuit precedent, the majority reaffirmed the well-settled rule that "when
government employees speak about corruption, wrongdoing, misconduct,
wastefulness, or inefficiency by other government employees.., their speech
is inherently a matter of public concern."'
40
The majority dismissed as absurd the defendants' argument that a
public employee who complained internally, but not publicly, lacked First
Amendment protection.' 4' It likewise rejected the defendants' contention
that Ceballos lacked protection because he had written the memorandum
"pursuant to his job responsibility."' 42  The majority reasoned that such a
rule would not protect employees who spoke on matters of public concern
in the course of performing their jobs, and would thus "seriously undermine
our ability to maintain the integrity of our governmental operations."'
43
The court added that such a rule would fall harshly on public employees
because they "all... have a duty to notify their supervisors about . . .
wrongful conduct.... ",,4'
In a special concurring opinion, Judge O'Scannlain agreed that the
settled law in the Ninth Circuit dictated a ruling for Ceballos,'4 5 but argued
that the Ninth Circuit law was inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
Pickering-Connick decisions.' 46 Conceding that the point had "rarely been
stated explicitly by the Supreme Court,"' 147 Judge O'Scannlain criticized the
majority's interpretation for ignoring the "implicit premise underlying the
First Amendment's hostility toward viewpoint-driven rules abridging the
freedom of speech is that such constraints impermissibly infringe upon
individuals' freedom of choice to express their personal opinions or
otherwise express themselves."'14 1 Public employees who express
themselves "in the course of carrying out their job duties"' 49 have no
139. Id. at 1173-1174 (noting that whether or not a statement was a matter of public concern was a
question of law).
140. Id. (citing Blair, 223 F.3d at 1079 (police officer who reports the misconduct of other officers
to his supervisors is entitled to First Amendment protection); Roth, 856 F.2d at 1405-6 (specifically
distinguishing between the speech on a matter of personal concern that was not protected in Connick and
plaintiffs statements revealing problems with government operations); and Johnson v. Multnomah
County, 48 F.3d 420, 425 (9th Cir. 1995)).
141. Garcetti, 361 F.3d at 1174 (citing Hufford v. McEnaney, 249 F.3d 1142, 1150(9th Cir. 2001);
Ulrich v. City and County of S.F., 308 F.3d 968, 979 (9th Cir. 2002); Keyser v. Sacramento City Unified
Sch. Dist., 265 F.3d 741, 747 (9th Cir. 2001); Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-49).
142. Garcetti, 361 F.3d at 1174-75.
143. Id. at 1175.
144. Id. at 1175-76.
145. Id. at 1185 (O'Scannlain, J., concurring).
146. Id. at 1186-88 (O'Scannlain, J., concurring). But see id. at 1177 n.7 (offering an alternative
interpretation of the cases cited by Judge O'Scannlain, and concluding there was no split in the circuits).
147. Id. at 1188 (O'Scannlain, J., concurring).
148. Id. at 1188-89 (O'Scannlain, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
149. Id. at 1189.
2008
HeinOnline  -- 29 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 195 2008
196 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW Vol. 29:1
personal interest in the content of their speech because they speak for their
employer. 150
B. In the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court held that Ceballos' had no First Amendment claim,
reversing the Ninth Circuit with a 5-4 majority. 151 Writing for the majority,
Justice Kennedy stated that "while the First Amendment invests public
employees with certain rights, it does not empower them to
'constitutionalize the employee grievance."" 52  Applying that principle in
the case before the Court, Kennedy concluded Ceballos' memo was not
entitled to First Amendment protection because it had been written
"pursuant to his duties as a calendar deputy."' 53 He added that statements
made pursuant to official duties might be protected by whistleblower
laws'54 and "obligations arising from any other applicable constitutional
provisions and mandates of the criminal and civil laws."' 55
IV.
GARCETTI APPLIED
As lower courts struggle to implement the decision, they approach
Garcetti in several ways: Some decisions emphasize process, assuming that
Garcetti altered plaintiffs burdens of pleading or proof. Others turn on
substance, focusing on the employee's position, the content of the
employee's speech, or the audience for the employee's statement.
Procedural concerns have complicated these post-Garcetti
adjudications. Courts frequently have been unwilling to decide these claims
on motions to dismiss,'56 and their decisions reveal considerable confusion
150. Id. at 1189,1193.
151. 126 S. Ct. at 1951.
152. Id. at 1959 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 154).
153. Id. at 1959-60 (noting that Ceballos admitted this was the case).
154. Id. at 1962. Some post-Garcetti cases suggest that whistleblower protections are not as
uniform, or extensive, as the majority's opinion suggests. See, e.g., Falk v. Phillips, No. 4:06CV00506,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63148 (D. Ark. Aug. 21, 2006) (no protection for plaintiff under Arkansas'
whistleblower law). See also the discussion in BriefofAmici Curiae Gov't Accountability Project et al.
in Support of Respondent, Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (No. 04-473), 2004 U.S. Briefs 473; and Daniel
Schulman, Office of Special Counsel's War on Whistleblowers, MOTHER JONEs Apr. 24, 2007, available
at http: // www.motherjones.com/news/feature/2007/05/dont whistlewhile-youwork.html (last
visited June 2, 2007) (arguing that federal government employees are not protected by whistleblower
laws or regulations).
155. 126 S. Ct. at 1962.
156. See, e.g., Bowers v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., No. 3:06CV41, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 78114, at *26-27 (W.D. Va. Oct. 24, 2006) (denying motion to dismiss based on Garcetti
because plaintiff alleged sufficient facts); Allen v. Or. Health Sci. Univ., No. 06-CV-285-BR, 2006 U.S.
Dist LEXIS 54885, at * 13-14 (D. Or. Aug. 4, 2006) (refusing to expand defendant's motion to dismiss a
state law claim to include a motion to dismiss a § 1983 claim based on Garcetti); McLaughlin v.
Pezzolla, No. 06-CV-00376, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13609, at *22-23 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2007)
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about the burden of pleading after Garcetti. While some courts require
discovery to provide evidence about a plaintiffs actual job duties,'57 others
simply assume that the employee spoke as a citizen absent an allegation to
the contrary.'58 In addition, while some courts instruct plaintiffs to refile
their complaints to address the issues raised in Garcetti,'59 others refuse to
allow plaintiffs to amend their complaint in light of Garcetti. 6 0
Nor has Garcetti made summary judgment more likely. Some courts
have relied on the case to grant motions for summary judgment;' 6' others
have used the decision to justify revisiting and reversing prior rulings
denying motions for summary judgment. 162 But other courts have refused
(denying motion to dismiss because unable to determine from the complaint whether plaintiffs
complaints made allegations that fell within her job duties) [hereinafter Pezzolla].
157. See, e.g., Rohrbough v. Univ. of Colo. Hosp., No. 06-CV-00995-REB-MJW, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 82087, at *7-8 (D. Colo., Nov. 8, 2006) (denying defendants' motion to dismiss because it is
unclear from the complaint whether plaintiffs job duties included the allegations of fraud and cover-ups
covered in her reports and complaints, the record must be developed more fully).
158. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. City of Nashville, No. 06-4069, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78133, at *7
(W.D. Ark. Oct. 23, 2006) [hereinafter City of Nashville].
159. See, e.g., Winters v. Meyer, 442 F. Supp. 2d 82, 87 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting that in the Second
Circuit, plaintiffs who allege retaliation "must plead in their complaints that their conduct is protected by
the First Amendment.").
160. See, e.g., Sigsworth v. City of Aurora, No. 05-4143, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 12204, at *11, 13
(7th Cir. May 25, 2007) (affirming district court's decision refusing to allow the plaintiff to amend).
161. See, e.g., Boykin v. City of Baton Rouge, 439 F. Supp. 2d 605, 610 (M.D. La. 2006) (granting
summary judgment to plaintiff who wrote diversity report pursuant to job as director of human
resources); Levy v. Office of Legislative Auditor, 459 F. Supp. 2d 494, 498-99 (M.D. La. 2006)
(granting motion for summary judgment against auditor who spoke at Toastmaster's meeting as part of
duties); Williams v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689, 693-94 (5th Cir. 2007) (affirming summary
judgment to athletic director's who wrote memo about funding related to his job); Ruotolo v. New York,
No. 03 Civ. 5045 (SHS), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49903, at *10-12 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2006) (granting
summary judgment against police sergeant, who produced report and statements about environmental
hazards made pursuant to official duties); Maras-Roberts v. Phillipe, No. 1:05-cv-1 148-SEB-JMS, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31661, at *18 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 27, 2007) (finding "no basis on which a reasonable jury
could reach [a] conclusion as a matter of fact that [plaintiff]'s speech was uttered by her in her capacity
as a private citizen .. "); Del Conte v. Borough of Ambler, No. 05-6191, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
64941, at *17-18 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 18, 2006) (granting summary judgment to assistant superintendent of
waste water treatment facility who made comments that were not on a matter of public concern);
Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 489 F. Supp. 2d 209, 222 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (granting summary
judgment motion with respect to plaintiff's comments to superior and grievance, denying motion with
respect to conversations with co-workers). Trujillo v. Bd. of Educ., No. 05-2305, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS
827, at *15, 17 (10th Cir. Jan. 12, 2007) (upholding district court's order denying motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that a fact finding hearing on the nature of the plaintiffs duties was required);
Kodrea v. City of Kokomo, 458 F. Supp. 2d 857, 868 (S.D. Ind. 2006) (refusing to grant defendant's
motion for summary judgment because questions remained about whether the plaintiff acted as a citizen
or an employee when complaining about a worker who was not doing his job); Jackson v. Jimino, No.
1:03-CV-722 (RFT), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4373, at * 17 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2007) (denying
defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs First Amendment claim because it is unclear
whether plaintiff, former Director of the Bureau of Real Estate, spoke as a knowledgeable private citizen
in his official capacity, or was defending himself from public attack).
162. Weintraub, 489 F. Supp. at 214 (quoting Casey v. W. Las Vegas Indep. Sch. Dist., 473 F.3d
1323, 1325 (10th Cir. 2007) (Garcetti "profoundly alters how courts review First Amendment retaliation
claims... " and requires reversal of prior decision denying defendant's motion for summary judgment);
Logan v. Dep't of Corr., No. l:04-cv-0797-SEB-JPG, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43631, at *7-8 (S.D. Ind.
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to grant those motions, finding that issues of fact (particularly with respect
to the employee's official duties) remain.'63 Garcetti has also caused
confusion in cases that went to trial. Several courts have ruled that they
must apply the decision to reverse verdicts,"6 but other have refused to do
so. 1
6 5
A. Shifting the Balance
Some early decisions found that Garcetti replaced the two-step
Pickering-Connick balancing test with a new, three-part inquiry. 166  The
June 26, 2006) (revisiting, and granting in light of Garcetti, defendants' motion for summary judgment).
Cf Chen v. Dougherty, No. C04-987MJP, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35828, at *5-6 (W.D. Wash. May 16,
2007) (allowing defendants the opportunity to renew a motion for summary judgment). But see Black v.
Columbus Pub. Sch., No. 2:96-cv-326, 2006 U.S. Dist LEXIS 57768, at "15 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 16, 2006)
(refusing to revisit motion for summary judgment); Campbell v. Galloway, 483 F.3d 258, 267 n.3 (4th
Cir. 2007) (refusing to apply Garcetti to a case pending prior to that decision).
163. See, e.g., Trujillo, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 827, at *17 (requiring fact finding hearing on the
nature of the plaintiff's duties); Kodrea, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 868 (stating that questions remain about
whether the plaintiff acted as a citizen or an employee when he complained about a worker who was not
doing his job); Jackson, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4373, at * 17 (stating that it is unclear whether plaintiff,
former Director of the Bureau of Real Estate, spoke as a knowledgeable private citizen in his official
capacity, or to defend himself from public attack).
164. See, e.g., Spiegla v. Hull, 481 F.3d 961, 967 (7th Cir. 2007) (setting aside verdict in light of
Garcetti); Broderick, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23698, at *6 (granting qualified immunity based on
Garcetti after jury ruled for plaintiff); Cf. Dillon v. Fermon, No. 04-CV-2029, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
59650, at *10-11 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2006) (relying on Garcetti to enter judgment for defendant after
first trial ended without a verdict,).
165. See, e.g., DeLuzio v. Monroe County, No. CV-00-1220, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78900, at
*19-20 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2006) (refusing to overturn jury verdict on First Amendment claim); Hailey v.
City of Camden, No. 01-3967, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45267, at *46-47 (D.N.J. July 5, 2006) (refusing
to overturn jury verdict on First Amendment claim). This seems to be the better view. While a
reviewing court can surely consider whether instructions were consistent with Garcetti, it is not clear
that appellate courts have the power to review the facts de novo. The Supreme Court has the power of
de novo review, but it apparently reserved that power to itself. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 150 n.10
(1983). Cf. Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 540, 548 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming part of verdict and
remanding part of verdict for further findings by trial judge).
166. Second Circuit: Benvenisti v. City of N.Y., No. 04 Civ. 3166 (JGK), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
73373, at *23-24 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2006) (noting that Garcetti split the first step of the Pickering-
Connick test into two distinct steps); Healey v. City of N.Y., No. 04 Civ. 7344 (DC), 2006 U.S.Dist.
LEXIS 7344, at *12-13 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2006) (citing Benvenisti). Third Circuit: see, e.g., Barclay v.
Michalsky, 451 F. Supp. 2d 386, 394 (D. Conn. 2006) (holding that before addressing the Pickering-
Connick balancing test, the court must first determine "whether plaintiff expressed her views as a
citizen, or as a public employee pursuant to her official duties."). Accord Bland v. Winant, No. 03-6091,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31094, at *11 (D.N.J. Apr. 27, 2007) (citing Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455
F.3d 225, 241-42 (3d Cir. 2006)); Jaworski v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., No. 05-4485, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6063, at *11-12 (D.N.J. Jan. 29, 2007); DeLuzio, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78900, at *12; Yatzus v.
Appoquinimink Sch. Dist., 458 F. Supp. 2d 235, 244 (D. Del. 2006). But see Bums v. City of
Glassboro, No. 05-3034 (JBS), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42069, at *18 (D.N.J. June 11, 2007) (setting out
a slightly different version of the three-part test).
Seventh Circuit: See, e.g., Spiegla, 481 F.3d at 965 (noting that whether an employee was speaking as a
citizen is a threshold inquiry after Garcetti); Sigsworth, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 12204, at *8 (7th Cir.
May 25, 2007); Mills v. City of Evansville, 452 F.3d 646, 647-49 (7th Cir. 2006); Logan v. Dep't of
Corr., No. l:04-cv-0797-SEB-JPG, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43631, at *3 (S.D. Ind. June 26, 2006);
Dillon, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59650, at *9-10. But see Doggett v. County of Cook, No. 05 C 2495,
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new test, articulated most completely by the Third Circuit, involves the
following steps:
1. A court must first examine the speaker's role to determine the
context of the speech. If the court finds that the speaker was speaking
within the scope of her official duties, the inquiry ends and there is no First
Amendment claim. 167
2. If the court determines that the speaker was speaking outside of her
official duties, then the court must next resolve whether the speech was on a
matter of public concern. If the court determines that the speech is not on a
matter of public concern, the inquiry ends and there is no First Amendment
protection. 16
8
Finally, if the court concludes that the speech was on a matter of public
concern, it must once again address the context of the speech, this time
looking to see whether the time, place and manner of the expression
disrupted or interfered with the government employer's mission. Where the
court finds the speech did either, First Amendment protection is denied. 
69
As this suggests, the circuits that employ this three-step analysis
assume that Garcetti established two distinct threshold questions: first,
whether the employee spoke as a citizen; and second, whether the speech
was on a matter of public concern. 170
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80722, at *15 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 3, 2006) (applying two-step Pickering-Connick
test).
Eighth Circuit: Lindsey v. City of Orrick, No. 05-0526-CV-W-DW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61439, at
*10-13 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 29, 2006) (applying a three-step analysis). But see Bradley v. James, 479 F.3d
536, 538 (8th Cir. 2007) (treating the inquiry as to whether plaintiff spoke in the capacity as a citizen as
part of the first step in the two-step Pickering-Connick test).
Two decisions from the courts in the Ninth Circuit rely on a retaliation analysis and avoid the Pickering-
Connick test entirely. See, e.g., lott v. Carter, No. 06-6001-TC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17517, at *4 (D.
Or. Mar. 8, 2007); Abbatiello v. County of Kauai, No. 04-00562 SOM/BMK, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8906, at *20 (D. Haw., Feb. 7, 2007). A decision by the D.C. Circuit combined the Pickering-Connick-
Garcetti inquiry with the retaliation inquiry, creating a four-step test. Wilburn v. Robinson, 480 F.3d
1140, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (employing the following test: (1) did plaintiff speak as a citizen on matter
of public concern, (2) did employer's interest override the plaintiff's right to speak, (3) did the speech
lead to the retaliation, and (4) would the employer have taken the same action in the absence of the
speech).
167. See, e.g., Maras-Roberts v. Phillipe, No. I:05-cv-1148-SEB-JMS, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
31661, at *18 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 27, 2007) (finding that, while there might be questions about whether
plaintiff spoke on a matter of public concern, there was "no basis on which a reasonable jury could reach
[a] conclusion as a matter of fact that [plaintiff]'s speech was uttered by her in her capacity as a private
citizen .... ").
168. See, e.g., Benvenisti, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73373, at *30-34 (holding that plaintiff spoke as
a citizen when he threatened to complain to another agency about nepotism problems in his department,
but his comments were not regarding a matter of public concern).
169. See. e.g., Mills, 452 F.3d at 648 (finding that even if Mills' statements were protected, her
superiors could conclude from her remarks that she did not intend to "zealously implement the Chief's
plans").
170. See also Cooper, supra note 3.
2008
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B. Formalism
In a recent article, Charles Rhodes argues that Garcetti exemplifies the
Supreme Court's increasing emphasis on formalism, an interpretative
method emphasizing bright-line rules and categorization.' 7 ' Rhodes
contends that Garcetti's distinction between "official duty speech" and
"unofficial speech" is a classic example of this approach. A number of
decisions seem to have read Garcetti in much the same way, though the
different cases offer various approaches to formalism. Some ground their
decision on the employee's status; others emphasize the content of the
speech; and still others focus on the audience at which the remarks were
directed.
Quite a few decisions that deny First Amendment protection focus on
the plaintiff's occupation. Three groups in particular have been singled out
in these decisions: law enforcement officers, lawyers, and teachers. Most of
these cases involve police officers or prison guards, and a disproportionate
number of those decisions deny these employees protection.' 72
Unsurprisingly, given Ceballos' occupation, quite a few cases involve
government lawyers - and in each of these cases, courts have denied First
Amendment protection. '73
Garcetti left open the issue of whether teachers were entitled to special
First Amendment protection. Courts have uniformly refused to protect
teachers' out-of-classroom statements, treating teachers as no different from
other public employees.'74 The cases that have addressed the issue of
teachers' classroom statements have come out in opposite directions. A
New York district court ruled that academic freedom protects the statements
of teachers within classrooms,"' and refused to dismiss the case of a
teacher who claimed to have not been rehired because she told her class that
she supported the re-election of President Bush. In contrast, the Seventh
Circuit held that a school district was entitled to dismiss a teacher for telling
a student that she had honked her car horn when she passed a sign that read
171. See Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, Public Employee Speech Rights Fall Prey to an Emerging
Doctrinal Formalism, 15 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1173 (2007).
172. More than a quarter of the cases decided in the year after Garcetti involve police officers or
prison guards. See Appendix, infra, for a list of cases.
173. Cindrich v. Fisher, 512 F. Supp. 2d 396 (W.D. Pa. 2006) (involving assistant district attorney);
Maras-Roberts v. Phillipe, No. l:05-cv-1148-SEB-JMS, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31661 (S.D. Ind. Apr.
27, 2007) (involving a public defender); Ansell v. d'Alleso, No. 3:05CV438 (MRK), 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 30308 (D. Conn. Apr. 25, 2007) (involving a private lawyer under contract with the state).
174. Pagani v. Meriden Bd. of Educ., No. 3:05-CV-01115 (JCH), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92267, at
* 11 (D. Conn. Dec. 19, 2006) (holding that teacher who reported to supervisor and state agency that
another teacher had shown nude photos to middle school students was not protected); Weintraub, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96714, at *26-27 (teacher's statements to assistant principal and during grievance not
protected, but see id., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96714, at *27 (same teacher's discussion of situation with
other teachers may be protected)).
175. Caruso v. Massapequa Union Free Sch., 478 F. Supp. 2d 377 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing
Garcetti, 126 S.Ct. at 1962).
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"Honk for Peace."'' 76 The court concluded that because the school paid her
salary, it could determine what she was entitled to teach and how she
should teach it. 1
77
Other formalist decisions emphasize position, not profession. In these
decisions, courts have found that the statements of supervisors,
178
inspectors, security officers,' 79 and any other employee whose duties
include monitoring or reporting8 ° were not entitled to First Amendment
protection.
176. Mayers v. Monroe County, 474 F.3d 477, 478 (7th Cir. 2007).
177. Id. at 479. The court suggested that Garcetti left open the question of how much room was left
for "constitutional protection of scholarly viewpoints" in post-secondary education. Id. at 480.
178. Cavozos v. Edgewood Ind. Sch. Dist., No. 05-51417, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 31114, at *2 (5th
Cir. Dec. 18, 2006) (holding that school principal who made statements in the course of a discipline
procedure was not protected because disciplining students was part of her supervisory job); Casey, 473
F.3d at 1331 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that because school superintendent had duty to report
mismanagement regarding Head Start funds, no protection); Boykin, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 610 (M.D. La.
2006) (holding that report written by director of Human Resources, criticizing city's handling of
diversity, was part of his job, and thus, he had no protection); Benvenisti, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73373,
at *27-28 (manager, no protection for his internal complaints about an employee); Franklin v. Clark, 454
F. Supp. 2d 356, 361-62 (D. Md. 2006) (holding that because duties of the director of human resources
included overseeing use of vehicles, no protection for report he wrote calling attention to misuse);
McGee v. Pub. Water Supply, 471 F.3d 918 (D. Md. 2006) (holding that because district manager's
complaint regarding the award of a contract fell within his job duties it was not protected); Logan v.
Dep't of Corr., No. l:04-cv-0797-SEB-JPG, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43631, at *5-6 (S.D. Ind. June 26,
2006) (holding that health care supervisor's "broad duties" included all aspects of prisoner health care,
and thus her complaints about the head nurse fell within the scope of her duties). But see Falk, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6148, at *10 (finding that assistant lab director may have viable claim that his report
of fraud in the lab was protected).
179. Ruotolo, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49903, at *13-14 (holding that environmental officer who
wrote a report on health issues at precinct and then spoke to inspectors about his report made statements
within the scope of his duties, and thus there was no protection); Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist.,
No. CV05-272-N-EJL, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7829, at *13-14 (D. Idaho Feb. 2, 2007) (holding school
security officer not entitled to protection for his complaint about school security problems); Schuster v.
Henry County, No. l:05-CV-239-TWT, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41780, at *17-19 (N.D. Ga. June 7,
2007) (holding that CFO had duty to report financial fraud, thus, comments were not protected); Clarke
v. Multnomah County, No. CV-06-229-HU, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21427, at *20-21 (D. Or. Mar. 23,
2007) (holding that statements made by business manager, about budget and taxes were part of her job,
and thus, not protected); Dennis v. Putnam County Sch. Dist., No. 5:05-CV-07 (CAR), 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23598, at *13-14 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 21, 2007) (holding no protection where fiscal officer's duties
included reporting financial irregularities).
180. Jaworski, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6063, at *13-14 (holding that because engineer's job
involved reporting on projects, he had no protection); Dunleavy v. Wayne County Comm'n, No. 04-CV-
74670-DT, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57238, at *12-13 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 16, 2006) (holding that auditor
whose job included investigating financial fraud was not entitled to protection for speaking to police
officers about fraud he uncovered); Williams v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689, 694 (5th Cir.
2007) (holding that because athletic director's duties included football budget, no protection for
complaints regarding funding); Clarke, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21427, at *21 (involving business
manager); Johnson v. George, No. 05-157-MPT, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35344, at *22-23 (D. Del. Mar.
15, 2007) (holding that director of community college had no protection for comments made during
chairs and directors meeting) [hereinafter George]; Yatzus, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 245-46 (holding that
because school psychologist's job required her to advocate for students, when she complained about
discrimination against special needs students her remarks were not protected). But see City of Nashville,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78133, at *8, 11-12 (holding that remarks of city financial director to the press
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When deciding cases that involve statements by non-supervisory
employees, courts inquire whether rules or laws required an employee to
make the statements at issue.' This variation on the formalist approach
has resulted in non-supervisory employees being disciplined for a variety of
comments, including some made outside of work. In Levy v. Office of the
Auditor General,'82 the court held that an auditor could be demoted for a
talk he gave at a Toastmaster's session. His department required employees
to join and participate in organizations that encouraged public speaking,
including Toastmasters.'83 Because plaintiff participated in Toastmasters as
a result of that directive, the court concluded that his remarks were part of
his official duties and therefore lacked First Amendment protection. 84
Other courts have applied a similar logic to statements made pursuant
to law, holding, for example, that a teacher with a statutory obligation to
report evidence of sexual harassment of students was not entitled to
regarding financial situation may have been protected); Moore v. Gabriel, No. 3:05-CV-31 (CDL), 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20895, at *15 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 23, 2007) (noting that job of state agency facilities
manager involved supervising maintenance, housekeeping and grounds work, and holding that because
his complaints about mismanagement of the facility and misuse of state property, and his Open Records
Act request were not related to his job, they may be protected).
181. See, e.g., Jennings v. County of Washtenaw, 475 F. Supp. 2d 692, 705 (E.D. Mich. 2007)
(involving attendant at juvenile center who reported security breaches by other attendants and whose
duties included reporting on the center's safety); Pagani, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92267, at *11 (finding
that state law required school teacher to report sexual abuse and harassment of students, and that there
was no protection for reporting that another teacher had shown nude photos to middle school students);
Morales v. Jones, 494 F.3d 590 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that because police officers were required to
report criminal activities, there was no protection for advising district attorney of apparent criminal
conduct by political figures); Spiegla, 484 F.3d at 969 (where rules required prison guard to report
misconduct, there was no protection; the court noted the irony of the fact that plaintiff was disciplined
for following the rules). Cf Walters v. County of Maricopa, No. CV 04-1920-PHX-NVW, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 60272, at *42 (D. Ariz. Aug. 22, 2006) (holding that speech was protected where plaintiff's
job did not entail reporting the wrongdoing of employees in other departments); DeLuzio v. Monroe
County, No. CV-00-1220, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78900, at *19-20 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2006) (holding
caseworker in juvenile home who complained about budget issues and misconduct by other caseworkers
was protected as there was no evidence that his job duties included oversight of either of these matters);
Rhodes v. Prince, No. 3:05-CV-2343-D, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9028, at *17-18 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 8,
2007) (holding that a crime scene investigator's report that police officers and co-workers were
falsifying evidence was protected because job did not include duty to report); BarclaY, 451 F. Supp. 2d
at 396 (holding that because plaintiff claimed that she had never received training on work rules
requiring the reporting of misconduct, questions remained about whether her statements were made as
part of her official duties). But see Skrutski v. Marut, No. 3: CV-03-2280, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
66024, at *29 (M.D. Pa. Sep. 15, 2006) (stating: "Defendants have relied on state police regulations and
the job description. This evidence is not dispositive of the issue [of whether plaintiff spoke as an
employee].")
182. Levy v. Office of Legislative Auditor, 459 F. Supp. 2d 494 (M.D. La. 2006) (finding that
plaintiff auditor was required by his job to join Toastmasters and give speeches and thus, his comments
in a Toastmasters speech were not entitled to First Amendment protection).
183. Id. at 497-98.
184. Id. at 498.
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protection.' At the same time, this version of formalism has protected
some statements by non-supervisory employees when courts have found
that the statements were outside the scope of the employee's defined
duties. 186
Still other holdings hinge on audience.' 87  In Milde v. Housing
Authority, the court ruled that the First Amendment might protect a
plaintiffs comments to a local newspaper, but that it did not protect a
memo she had written to her supervisor, or her formal complaint to the
Board.'88  The court noted that the plaintiffs official duties involved
185. Pagani, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92267, at *11 (finding state law required school teacher to
report sexual abuse and harassment of students, and thus, there was no protection for reporting that
another teacher had shown nude photos to middle school students).
186. See, e.g., Coles v. Moore, No. 3:04-cv-1623 (JCH), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73505, at *13 (D.
Conn. Sept. 25, 2006) (holding that plaintiff, whose speech went beyond job duties, was entitled to
protection); Lindsey, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61439, at *12 (holding that although plaintiff was required
by his job to go to city council meetings, because he spoke on matters unrelated to his assignment, his
speech was protected); Casey, 473 F.3d at 1331-32 (holding that employee fired for making comments
to several different people was only entitled to protection for statements made to Attorney General
because those statements were outside of his job duties); Morales, 494 F.3d 590 (holding that police
officer's statements to attorney general were not protected, but deposition testimony about the same
matter was protected because the officer did not make these statements as part of his job duties). Cf
Pezzolla, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13609, at *28 (holding more evidence was needed to determine
whether case worker's obligation to serve as advocate for her clients included duty to write letters to
NYCLU).
187. See, e.g., City of Nashville, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78133, at *8-9 (holding that city finance
director who wrote report during city election, gave interviews about it to reporters, and was thereafter
fired, had viable First Amendment claim for her statements to the press); Benvenisti, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 73373, at *38 (noting that the forum in which the speech is made is an important factor in
determining whether the speech is protected); Battle v. Bd. of Regents, 468 F.3d 755, 759 (1 1th Cir.
2006) (holding that because plaintiff did not make her complaints about fraud to anyone outside of the
university, she had no protection); lott, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17517, at *8 (noting in finding that
plaintiff had no First Amendment claim, that it was significant his comments were made on the job at
the workplace and not to a member of the general public).
These cases often employ an internal-external distinction, protecting statements made outside the office
(external) and denying protection to those made at work (internal). Cf Randy J. Kozel,
Reconceptualizing Public Employee Speech, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1007 (2005) (arguing that the Pickering-
Connick analysis should be abandoned and replaced by a standard that protects speech by government
employees made outside the workplace, while providing no protection to speech at work). Interestingly,
Kozel clerked for Justice Kennedy in the 2005 Term in which Garcetti was decided. http: //
en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/List-of law clerks of the_.SupremeCourt of theUnitedStates)
188. Milde v. Hous. Auth. of Greenwich, No. 3:00CV2423(AVC), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62791,
at *19-20 (D. Conn. Sept. 5, 2006). See also Green v. Bd. of County Comm'rs., 472 F.3d 794, 800-01
(10th Cir. 2007) (noting as significant that plaintiff did not protest faulty drug tests to newspapers or the
legislature, but rather complained internally and to the manufacturer of the machine with whom she was
supposed to communicate about problems, and finding she had no protection); Ion, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17517, at *8 (noting, in finding plaintiff had no First Amendment claim, that it was significant
his comments were made on the job, at the workplace and not to a member of the general public);
Jackson v. Jimino, No. 1:03-CV-722 (RFT), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4373, at *48-49 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 19,
2007) (distinguishing between letters plaintiff wrote on official letterhead which were not protected and
subsequent letters and statements made to the press which were protected); City of Nashville, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 78133, *8-9 (holding that although the report on finances written by city finance director
would not be protected because written as part of her job, the interviews she gave about the report to the
press were protected).
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reporting to her supervisor and that state licensing laws required that she
attend Board meetings.' 89 In contrast, because it found that it was unclear
whether she had an obligation to speak to the press, the court refused to rule
as a matter of law that her statements to the Greenwich Times were
unprotected.' 9o
Applying variations on this formalist logic, some courts have protected
public employees who sent letters and complaints to another agency,19' the
state prosecutor, 19 2 the city council,' 93 state legislators, 194 the governor,' 95 or
senators.' 96 Decisions that focus on audience also draw distinctions based
on the medium of the message. Typically courts find no First Amendment
protection for comments, statements, or writing prepared on official
letterhead. 9' In contrast, statements prepared on home computers, using
personal email accounts, or sent from home addresses often are protected.' 9'
189. Milde, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62791, at *17-18 (involving licensing requirements).
190. 1d. at *20-21. Accord Hailey v. City of Camden, No. 01-3967, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45267,
at *48 (D.N.J. July 5, 2006) (holding letter to the editor was protected); Sassi v. Lu-Gold, No. 10450
(CLB), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13643, at * 11-12 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2007) (holding that letters to editor
written by police chief that stated they were written by "a resident taxpayer" were protected). But see
Andrew v. Clark, 472 F. Supp. 2d 659, 661-63 (D. Md. 2007) (holding that internal memo written as an
employee did not become protected when he gave it to the press); Kougher v. Burd, No. 1:04-CV-2209,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8416, at *31-32 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 2007) (holding that state dog warden who
responded to reporter's queries about complaint he had filed against kennel had no First Amendment
claim because he was not disciplined for his remarks, bur rather for violating department policy
requiring employees obtain permission before answering media inquiries).
191. See, e.g., Falk, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63148, at *10 (finding it significant that plaintiff
complained to an outside agency); Benvenisti, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73373, at *30-34 (finding that
plaintiff made threat to take complaint to state agency was as a citizen, however no protection since the
complaint was not on a matter of public concern); Freitag, 468 F.3d at 545-46 (holding that written and
oral comments to inspector general are entitled to protection, but forms and reports written pursuant to
job duties are not).
192. Compare Casey, 473 F.3d at 1332 (holding that district superintendent who reported
noncompliance with open meetings act to the state's attorney was entitled to First Amendment
protection for that report, since she had no duty to make a report to that office) with Dillon, 2006 U.S.
Dist LEXIS 59650, at *10-11 & n.l (holding that Illinois state trooper was not entitled to protection for
his phone call informing Indiana prosecutor that another officer was not telling the truth about a criminal
investigation, because it was related to his job duties); Brewster v. City of Poughkeepsie, 434 F. Supp.
2d 155 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding letters by police officer to district attorney not protected because their
content was related to his job duties).
193. See, e.g., Hailey, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45267 at *48 (involving a city council meeting);
Lindsey, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61439, at *4-5 (involving a city council meeting).
194. See, e.g., Charles v. Tex. Lottery Comm'n, No. A-06-CA-158 LY, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
84032, at *11-13 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 2006) (holding that plaintiff's emails to Texas legislators listing
violations by his employer were protected).
195. See, e.g., Benoit v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 459 F. Supp. 2d 513, 518 (E.D. La. 2006) (holding that
letter to governor was protected even though it related to matters employee plaintiff worked on). But see
Franklin, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 360 (holding no protection for reporting abuse of official vehicles to city
officials because memo and emails were within scope of Plaintiff's job).
196. See, e.g., Benoit, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 518 (finding letter to Senator was protected); Freitag, 468
F.3d at 544-45 (also finding letter to Senator was protected).
197. See, e.g., Jackson v. Jimino, No. 1:03-CV-722 (RFT), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4373, at *32
(N.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2007) (viewing as significant the fact that plaintiff wrote letters to county attorney on
official letterhead in finding no protection). But cf Bowers, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78114, at *22-23
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C. Implications
The majority in Garcetti encouraged employers to create "internal
policies and procedures that are receptive to employee criticism."'99  At
least one amicus brief filed with the Supreme Court worried that employers
that required employees to report misconduct through formal processes
would then claim that employees who used these processes were acting
pursuant to their official duties, and were therefore not entitled to
constitutional protection. 00 That worry was well founded; several lower
courts have allowed employers to punish employees who report misconduct
through official channels.' In the process, courts have held that seemingly
justified complaints of harassment,2 2 discrimination,2 3 abuse,20 4 fraud,205
(holding that when plaintiff used university email account, but indicated in subject line that the content
was not work related, it may have been protected).
198. See, e.g., DeLuzio, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *22 (finding it significant that plaintiff's
complaints about a co-worker's conduct were written "on his own paper, rather than on official
complaint forms."); Charles, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84032, at *12-13 (noting that plaintiff used private
email account and gave home address and phone number). But see Bowers, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
78114, at *26-27 (holding that plaintiff who used university email account, but indicated in subject line
that the content was not work related, may be protected).
199. 126 S. Ct. at 1951.
200. Brief of Amici Curiae Gov't Accountability Project et al. in Support of Respondent at 3, 7-8,
Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1951 (No. 04-473), 2004 U.S. Briefs 473.
201. Casey, 473 F.3d at 1330-31 (holding that a school official who was obliged by law to report
misconduct to federal government, and did so, is not protected); Pagani, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92267,
at * 11 (holding that a teacher is not protected for reporting sexual abuse of students by another teacher,
even though the law required him to do so); Spiegla, 481 F.3d at 967 (holding no protection for prison
guard who reported, as she was required to do, that other guards violated security rules).
202. Thampi v. Collier County Bd. of Comm'rs, No. 2:04-cv-441-FtM-29SPC, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15311, at *26-31 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 2007) (involving harassment of employees); Campbell, 483
F.3d at 271-72 (noting that complaints of sexual harassment fall into "gray area" between private
complaint and public concern, and are therefore not protected); Iott, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17517, at
*6, 10 (involving complaints about harassment of prisoners).
203. Jennings, 475 F. Supp. 2d at 699 (holding no protection for plaintiff who complained that a
co-worker who had committed safety violations would not be punished because she was having affair
with supervisor); Yatzus, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 235 (finding no protection for school psychologist who
complained that special needs students were being discriminated against); Wilburn v. Robinson, 480
F.3d 1140, 1150-51 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that complaint of discrimination with respect to job
appointments was not protected).
204. Pagani, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *11 (involving sexual abuse of students); Thampi, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15311 at *32-33 (involving harassment of workers); lIt, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *6
(involving abuse of prisoners). But see Black v. Columbus Public School, No. 2:96-cv-326, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 57768 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 16, 2006) (holding that assistant principal who reported an affair at
her school that she felt created inequitable treatment was protected, as such reporting was not part of her
job duties).
205. Schuster, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41780, at *2 (involving financial fraud); Springer v. City of
Atlanta, No. l:05-cv-0713-GET, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54326, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 2006)
(involving fiscal mismanagement); Bailey, 451 F.3d at 519 (involving misuse of public funds); Thampi,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15311, at *33-38 (involving financial mismanagement); Healey, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 86344, at *12-14 (involving financial fraud); Clarke, 2007 U.S. Dist LEXIS 21427, at *33-35
(involving financial problems including fraud and double dipping).
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criminal acts, 2 6 safety or security violations, 20 7 and equipment failures
2 8
were not protected.
A few decisions take this line of reasoning a step further, declaring that
there is no constitutional protection for statements, including sworn
testimony, made during investigations into wrongdoing.2 °9 Courts in the
Eleventh Circuit have pushed this principle the farthest, ruling that a police
officer who testified before a grand jury21° and a prison official who
testified at an emergency hearing regarding jail security 211 were not entitled
to First Amendment protection because they testified as part of their official
duties.212
Ignoring the long history of constitutional protection for political
speech,213 still other cases have extended Garcetti's reach into the political
process. In Hogan v. Township of Haddon, the court ruled that the First
Amendment was not violated when two members of the township
commission denied an elected township commissioner access to the
206. Sigsworth, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 12204, at *12-13 (holding police officer who reported that
the targets of a drug raid had been tipped off by other officers was not protected); Dillon, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 59650, at *I I (holding there was no protection for state trooper who reported that another
officer was not telling the truth about a particular criminal investigation, because it was part of
plaintiff's job duties).
207. Ruotolo, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49903, at *11-13 (involving safety and health violations);
Spiegla, 481 F.3d at 967 (involving security violations in prison); 475 F. Supp. 2d at 692 (involving
security violations in juvenile facility); Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist., No. CV05-272-N-EJL,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7879, at * 15 (D. Idaho Feb. 2, 2007) (involving security risks at school).
208. Green v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 472 F.3d 794, 800-01 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that lab
technician who determined drug screening system used by her department was reporting false positives
and spoke to state agency and manufacturer about the problem was not protected because
communications were related to her official duties).
209. Bradley, 479 F.3d at 538 (holding that because police officer had duty to cooperate with an
investigation, his statements during that investigation were not entitled to protection); Ruotolo, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49903, at *11-13 (holding that police officer who spoke to union lawyers in the course
of their investigation into his report that the precinct was unsafe was not entitled to protection because
he had to cooperate with the investigation); Burns, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42069, at *22-23 (holding no
protection for statements made during an investigation because plaintiff had duty to cooperate). But cf
Harris v. Tunica County, No. 2:05CV126, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7473, at *7-8 (N.D. Miss. Feb. 1,
2007) (finding that a jailer who made statements to Internal Affairs as part of an investigation into
another jailer's alleged misconduct may be entitled to First Amendment protection since her job duties
did not entail monitoring the behavior of other employees or participating in investigations).
210. DePrado v. City of Miami, 446 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1346 (S.D. Fla. 2006).
211. Green v. Barrett, No. 06-15104, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 6200 at *9 (1 Ith Cir. Mar. 14, 2007),
rev'g 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63551 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 6, 2006).
212. In contrast, several cases from the Seventh Circuit indicate that statements made in testimony
are protected. See Morales, 494 F.3d at 590 (holding that police officers' reports of criminal activity to
district attorney are not protected because required by their job, but one officer's deposition testimony
was protected because testimony was not part of his official duties); Fairley v. Fermaint, 482 F.3d 897,
902 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding prison guards could not be retaliated against for testifying in civil rights
trials). See also Broderick, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23698 (refusing to grant summary judgment against
plaintiff on his claim he was retaliated against for bringing a lawsuit protesting his treatment for earlier
complaints).
213. See discussion supra at notes 6-8, and 84-95.
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township website, cable channel and newspaper.2 4 The court reasoned that
because the township paid the commissioner's salary, the latter used those
media "as part of her official duties and in her capacity [as] a Township
commissioner (and Township employee), rather than as a private
citizen."2"5  In Mills v. City of Evansville, the Seventh Circuit held that a
police chief could transfer a sergeant who intimated that she "would try to
enlist community organizations against [a proposed shift change plan]
rather than describe its virtues," 2 6  thereby allowing the government
employer to take a retaliatory measure to prevent an employee from
publicizing concerns about a policy decision.2t7
As these summaries suggest, in the first wave of post-Garcetti cases,
the lower courts read the case in a variety of ways as they struggled to
implement it. But for all the confusion they reveal over the precise nature
of Garcetti's holding, these cases demonstrate a tendency to read the case
as a broad restriction on public employee's First Amendment rights.
V.
RECONSIDERING GARCETTI
Yet it is not clear that Garcetti should be read so broadly, and some
lower courts refused to do so. A few courts declined to adopt the formalist
reading of Garcetti,215 emphasizing instead that the question of whether an
employee's speech is made pursuant to official duties is a practical, factual
inquiry. 219 As one court put it, the inquiry should not be whether the speech
is related to the employee's work, but whether it is made in the employee's
214. No. 04-2036, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87200 (D.N.J. Dec. 1, 2006).
215. Id. at *23.
216. Mills, 452 F.3d at 647.
217. Id. But cf Rutan, 497 U.S. at 65 (holding that transfers based on political affiliation are not
allowed in political patronage cases).
218. Barclay, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 397 (holding it is not dispositive that plaintiff complained to his
supervisors and did not go to the press).
219. Walters, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60272, at *42 (noting that "[a]ny attempt to inflate
[Plaintiff's] job description so as to include blowing the whistle on other officers would likely exceed
the 'practical inquiry' suggested by the Supreme Court [in Garcetti]."); Burke v. Nittman, No. 05-cv-
01766-WYD-PAC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15329, at *13-15 (D. Colo. Mar. 2, 2007) (noting inability to
determine if plaintiff's job as a safety and security officer entailed the reporting of misconduct); Falk,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63148, at *9-10 (holding that assistant lab director's report of fraud in the lab
may be protected); Rohrbough, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82087, at *8 (holding that hospital administrator
who spoke out on misconduct and a possible cover up may be entitled to protection for her remarks);
Barclay, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 396 (holding that because plaintiff claimed she had no training on work
rules, questions remained about whether her statements were required by her job); Pezzolla, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13609, at *28 (holding that more evidence was needed to determine whether case worker's
obligation to act as advocate included duty to write letters to an NYCLU attorney); Abbatiello, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8906, at *28, 31-32 (finding a question of fact as to whether plaintiff's job duties as a
police officer included reporting the misconduct of others).
2008
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official capacity. 2 ' Additionally, some courts note that Garcetti required a
case-by-case analysis of public employee speech claims.22'
Other courts ruled that the two-step Pickering-Connick test remains the
standard. They treat the "citizenship" inquiry, which Garcetti
highlighted, as part of the "public concern" analysis required by the first
step.223 These courts emphasize that the word "citizen" has always been an
element of the Pickering-Connick test, appearing initially in Pickering.24
and then in the first step of the test established in Connick.225
There is some merit to both interpretations. The facts of the case and
the Pickering-Connick test were more important to its outcome than many
lower courts have recognized. But recognizing the importance of those
factors is not enough. Analysis that tries to limit Garcetti's reach by
limiting it to its facts or by asserting that the opinion merely restates the law
ignores an important element of the case - the extent to which Garcetti
reframed the problem of public employee speech cases and, in the process,
clarified the protections to which public employees are entitled.
A. Limiting Garcetti to its Facts
The lower court decisions that reject the formalist view of Garcetti
provide a more accurate interpretation of the Court's opinion. Garcetti
emphasized the fact-based nature of the inquiry in determining whether a
particular plaintiff spoke as a citizen or as an employee. The majority
explicitly stated that the fact that Ceballos' memo "concerned the subject
matter of [his] employment" was "not dispositive. ' '2 6  Furthermore, the
Court stated that certain statements, even if they were made at work, were
220. Barclay, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 395 (noting that Garcetti provides that the determination of job
duties is a practical analysis).
221. Abbatiello, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8906, at *28, 31-32 (finding a question of fact as to
whether plaintiffs job duties, as police officer, included reporting the misconduct of others); Barclay,
451 F. Supp. 2d at 395 (employing fact-based analysis).
222. See, e.g., Bradley, 479 F.3d at 538; Schuster, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41780, at *10; Batt v.
City of Oakland, No. C 02-04975, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77087, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2006)
(noting the similarities between the Pickering test and the application of the Garcetti analysis and
finding that the Garcetti decision only slightly modifies the Pickering standard); Charles, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 84032, at *8; Cheek v. City of Edwardsville, No. 06-2210-JWL, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
71353, at *5 (D. Kan. Sep. 29, 2006); George, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35344, at *11; Price v. MacLeish,
No. 04-956 (GMS), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57026, at *12 (D. Del. Aug. 14, 2006).
223. Cheek, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71353, at *5 (noting that inquiry as to whether plaintiff spoke
as a citizen is part of the first step in a Pickering-Connick analysis).
224. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
225. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147. See Coles, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73505.
226. 126 S. Ct. at 1959 (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 573 and Givhan, 439 U.S. at 414). But see
Price, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57026, at *17 (characterizing the Court's statement in this regard as
dicta.).
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still entitled to First Amendment protection. 27  Far from mandating
protections based on a type of formalist pigeonholing, Garcetti requires
courts to undertake a case-by-case analysis of the nature of an employee's
duties228 and of the context of the employee's speech.121
But it is not enough to recognize that the Supreme Court's decision in
Garcetti requires a fact-based analysis. Several specific findings of fact
were so crucial to the Court's holding that they limit Garcetti's reach to a
greater extent than even the anti-formalist decisions recognize.
The first critical finding of fact relates to Ceballos' communication.
The majority focused exclusively on Ceballos' memo, ruling that it failed
both steps of the Pickering-Connick test. 230 With respect to the first step,
the majority concluded that memo was not a statement by a citizen on a
matter of public concern.23' With respect to the second step, the majority
found that it urged a course of action Ceballos' superiors felt was
inappropriate. 232
The tight focus of the Court's inquiry is important. As Justice Souter
noted in his dissent,233 the Court never reached the issue of whether
Ceballos' statements to his colleagues, or to his supervisors, or to the
Mexican American Lawyers Association, were made as an employee or as a
citizen. Nor did the majority address whether Ceballos' testimony during
the motion to traverse was made in his capacity as a citizen or as an
employee. Thus, the holding in Garcetti does not clearly extend to similar
statements made by other public employees.234
Nor does Garcetti necessarily stand for the proposition that memos or
reports that public employees write at work lack First Amendment
protection. The majority explained that it held Ceballos' memo was not
entitled to First Amendment protection because "the parties . . .do not
dispute that Ceballos wrote his disposition memo pursuant to his
employment duties. 235  Whereas routine memos and reports written by
other public employees may indeed lack protection when they fall within
227. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1959 (noting, "That Ceballos expressed his views inside his office,
rather than publicly, is not dispositive. Employees in some cases may receive First Amendment
protection for expressions at work ... ," and citing Givhan, 439 U.S. at 414).
228. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1961.
229. Id. at 1962.
230. Id. at 1959-60.
231. Id. at 1960 (noting Ceballos "did not speak as a citizen writing a memo that addressed the
proper adjudication of a case").
232. Id. at 1960-61 ("IffCeballos' superiors thought his memo was inflammatory or misguided they
had the authority to take proper corrective action.").
233. Id. at 1971-72 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court remanded the case for the Ninth
Circuit to consider Ceballos' other communications).
234. Cf Transcript Oral Argument at 13, Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1951 (Ceballos' comments to the
Bar Association went beyond step one of the Pickering-Connick test because they were not part of his
normal duties).
235. 126 S. Ct. at 1961.
2008
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the category of "expressions made pursuant to official responsibilities,"236
the majority's opinion did not create a blanket rule to that effect. 237  The
Court also declined to explain how lower courts should determine whether a
memo or report was written as part of an employee's official duties when
the scope of those duties is in dispute.238
Two other factors, though not explicit in the Court's analysis, appear to
have influenced the majority's opinion. The first is the fact that Ceballos
was an assistant district attorney. In Legal Services Corporation v.
Velazquez, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Court noted that attorneys
who represent the government in civil and criminal cases "deliver the
government's message. ' 239  The Court went on to draw a distinction
between public defenders and legal aid lawyers, who are paid by the
government, but are presumed to speak only for their clients, and
prosecutors, whose message is controlled by their government employer.240
The fact that Ceballos was a prosecutor appears to have influenced the
Garcetti opinion for much the same reason.24'
In dissent, Justice Breyer also emphasized Ceballos' position, asserting
that the majority's treatment of his case ignored the constitutional
imperatives that constrained prosecutors.242 He feared the majority's
decision would discourage some prosecutors from reporting constitutional
or ethical violations.243 Justice Breyer noted that the federal judiciary
should be especially concerned with the integrity of the legal system,244
which was particularly fraught at the time Ceballos wrote his memo.245
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1959 (noting that "[t]he memo concerned the subject matter of Ceballos' employment,
but that, too, is not dispositive.").
238. Id. at 1961 ("We thus have no occasion to articulate a comprehensive framework for defining
the scope of an employee's duties in cases where there is room for serious debate.").
239. 531 U.S. at 542.
240. Id. (citing Polk County v. Dobson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981)).
241. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1960 (referring repeatedly to the fact that Ceballos wrote his memo
pursuant to his duties as a calendar deputy).
242. Id. at 1974-76 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88
(1935) (noting "[t]he United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty . . . whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is . . . that
justice shall be done .... It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce
a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one."); A.B.A. SEC.
CRIM. JUST., PROSECUTORIAL FUNCTION, Standard 3-1.2(b-c) and 3-1.5. But see Richard A. Epstein,
Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4,
70 (1988) ("The government does not have anything like a monopoly position over the district attorneys
it employs, for both local governments and private firms hire criminal lawyers."). Epstein's analysis of
the lack of monopoly power misses the point about the impact of the Garcetti-like silencing of a
prosecutor with respect to a particular case, since in such a case the unconstitutional condition
completely preempts a particular viewpoint.
243. 126 S.Ct. at 1974-75 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
244. Id. Cf Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 547 (noting the harm to the judicial system if legal and
constitutional challenges cannot be made).
245. See discussion supra notes 105-110.
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Thus, it is noteworthy that the majority did not engage in analyzing the
content of Ceballos' memo.
A second fact may explain why the majority failed to address the
content of Ceballos' memo. The majority noted that a judge had evaluated
and rejected Ceballos' misgivings about the affidavit during the motion to
traverse. 246  This adjudication meant that although the majority recognized
that Ceballos believed his memo exposed serious problems,4 7 the majority
could reduce the dispute between Ceballos and his supervisors to a
disagreement over trial tactics.248 This allowed the Court to avoid framing
the case as a situation in which an employee alerted his superiors to a
criminal act or significant misconduct, or as one in which a supervisor
suppressed an investigation into such wrongdoing. 49
B. Garcetti and the Pickering-Connick Test
The majority's characterization of the case as a tactical disagreement
between an employee and his supervisors influenced the way it applied the
Pickering-Connick test. Consequently, while the minority of lower courts
was correct in rejecting the notion that Garcetti added an element to that
test, 25 they missed a crucial element of the decision by failing to consider
how the majority applied the test in this case.
Garcetti did not add elements to the Pickering-Connick test. On the
contrary, the majority cited both opinions frequently, 25' referred explicitly
to the two-step analysis derived from those cases,252 and used both steps in
246. 126 S. Ct. at 1956.
247. Id. at 1959 (noting that "[r]espondent Ceballos believed that the affidavit used to obtain a
search warrant contained serious misrepresentations."). See also id. at 1955 (the majority opinion
disregarded the Ninth Circuit's finding that Ceballos' superiors agreed that there were problems with the
affidavit). See Garcetti, 361 F.3d at 1171 (stating "[e]veryone agreed that the validity of the warrant
was questionable," but holding that de novo review and re-interpretation of the facts was consistent with
its authority under Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-50).
248. 126 S. Ct. at 1960 (Ceballos "spoke as a prosecutor fulfilling a responsibility to advise his
supervisor about how best to proceed with a pending case"); id. (Ceballos' "memo ...addressed the
proper disposition of a pending criminal charge); id. at 1960-61, ("If Ceballos' superiors thought his
memo was inflammatory or misguided, they had the authority to take proper corrective action."). But cf
id. at 1965-66 (Souter, J., dissenting) (characterizing Ceballos' memo as a statement against a "rogue"
law enforcement officer); 126 S. Ct. at 1974 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (characterizing the memo as raising
important constitutional concerns under Brady v. Maryland).
249. Cf Gonzales, 239 F.3d at 939; Delgado, 282 F.3d at 518-19 (noting that "[olur holding in
Gonzales is limited to routine discharge of assigned functions, where there is no suggestion of public
motivation. In the case now before the court, [plaintiff's] communications with his superiors were
designed not only to convey information of possible crimes, but also additional facts that were relevant
to the manner and scope of any subsequent investigation."). See discussion supra notes 132-135.
250. See discussion supra notes 168-69.
251. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1957-59 (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 563); id. at 1957-58, 1961 (citing
Connick, 461 U.S. at 138).
252. The Court explained its analysis as follows:
Pickering and the cases decided in its wake identify two inquiries to guide interpretation of the
constitutional protections accorded to public employee speech. The first requires determining
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its analysis of Ceballos' claim. 253  Yet while the majority applied the
Pickering-Connick test, it did not follow the test as it was articulated in
Connick. The Garcetti majority observed 254 Connick's holding that the first
step in the two-step test was a threshold question.255 In Connick, the two
steps were completely distinct; if the plaintiffs claim failed at the first,
there was no need to even address the employer's treatment of the
employee's speech.256 In Garcetti, however, the steps were mingled
together; evidence of the supervisor's treatment of Ceballos' memo
257
(relevant to the second step of the test 258 ) was used to show that Ceballos'
work product was prepared as part of his official duties 259 (relevant to the
first step of the test). In this respect, Garcetti returned to the older, more
fluid, relative approach that the Court had used in Pickering,260 where the
two parts of the test were balanced against one another.
C. Management Rights & Employee Speech
Balancing the two parts of the Pickering-Connick test against one
another, the Garcetti Court used the supervisors' response to Ceballos'
memo to help establish that Ceballos spoke as an employee and not as a
citizen. This approach has larger implications for public employee speech
claims, and requires an analysis of the way the majority characterized
Ceballos' claim.
In describing the difference between speaking as an employee and
speaking as a citizen at work, the majority treated a number of phrases-
"professional responsibilities, ' 261 "professional capacity," '262 "performing..
. job duties," '263 "tasks ... paid to perforrn," 2 "official duties, '"265 "official
responsibilities," '266 and "employment duties" 267-as synonyms that defined
whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern. If the answer is no, the
employee has no First Amendment cause of action based on his or her employer's reaction to
the speech. If the answer is yes, then the possibility of a First Amendment claim arises. The
question becomes whether the relevant government entity had an adequate justification for
treating the employee differently from any other member of the general public.
Id. at 1958 (internal citations omitted).
253. Id. at 1960-61.
254. Id. at 1958.
255. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147.
256. Id.
257. 126 S. Ct. at 1960-61.
258. Id. at 1958.
259. Id. at 1960.
260. See discussion supra at notes 37-40.
261. 126 S. Ct. at 1960.
262. Id. at 1960.
263. Id. at 1961.
264. Id. at 1960.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 1961.
267. Id.
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the term employee (as opposed to the term citizen). The majority elaborated
on what it meant by these terms268 when it characterized Ceballos' tasks:
"When he went to work and performed the tasks he was paid to perform,
Ceballos acted as a government employee. The fact that his duties
sometimes required him to speak or write does not mean his supervisors
were prohibited from evaluating his performance." '269
The majority has equated "acting as an employee" with two elements:
(1) performing routine, reviewable tasks; and (2) working under the control
of supervisors to carry out the mission of the office. 270 The fact that a
supervisor controls the employee's speech establishes that the latter speaks
as an employee, rather than as a citizen. The idea that management control
is central to the definition of an "employee" was reinforced when the
majority noted that Ceballos' supervisors could "take proper corrective
action" if they thought his memo was "inflammatory or misguided."27 '
By framing the issue this way, the majority echoed the idea of
management rights, a concept long familiar in labor law.272 The parameters
of that doctrine are contested,273 but all theories of management rights
accept that employers have the discretion to define their mission, tasks, and
work product. As Arthur Goldberg once put it, the concept of management
rights is simply "a recognition of the fact that somebody must be the boss....
People can't be wandering around at loose ends, each deciding what to do
next. Management decides what the employee is to do.1 274 This conception
268. Id. ("We thus have no occasion to articulate a comprehensive framework for defining the
scope of an employee's duties in cases where there is room for serious debate.").
269. Id. at 1960.
270. Id. (Ceballos' supervisors had the right to make sure statements are "accurate, demonstrate
sound judgment, and promote the employer's mission.").
271. Id. at 1960-61.
272. See generally ELKOURI & ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 634-833(6th ed. 2003)
(extended discussion of the concept) [hereinafter ELKOURI & ELKOURI]; GORMAN & FINKIN, BASIC
TEXT ON LABOR LAW 635 (2d ed. 2004). But see Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97
HARV. L. REV. 1676, 1691 (1984) [hereinafter Public Employment] (arguing that the idea of
management rights, developed in the private sector, is "ultimately flawed [in the public sector], both
because it accords government the same unwarranted managerial prerogatives that have been granted to
private employers and because it fails to account for the public employer's special role as political
decision maker.").
273. James T. O'Reilly, Collision in the Congress: Congressional Accountability. Workplace
Conflict and the Separation of Powers, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 36 & nn. 250-51 (1996) (noting "[t]he
issue of management rights has been a controversial topic in both state collective bargaining laws and
private sector grievance arbitration."); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Re-Envisioning Labor Law: A
Response to Professor Finkin, 45 MD. L. REV. 978, 989-93 (1986) (discussing some of the disputes over
management rights under the NLRA). See also Public Employment, supra note 272, at 1691; ELKOURI
& ELKOURI, supra note 272, at 634-41.
274. Arthur Goldberg, Management's Reserved Rights: A Labor View, in MANAGEMENT RIGHTS
AND THE ARBITRATION PROCESS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 9"' ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NAA 118, 120-
21 (1956). See also ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 272, at 634 (quoting HILL & HOOK,
MANAGEMENT AT THE BARGAINING TABLE 56 (1945) (arguing that management rights are "those rights,
or that authority, which management must have in order successfully to carry out its function of
managing the enterprise.")).
2008
HeinOnline  -- 29 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 213 2008
214 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW Vol. 29:1
is apparent in the majority's finding that Ceballos made his statements as an
employee because his memo was subject to his supervisor's review and
revision.27
By embedding the doctrine of management rights into public employee
speech cases, Garcetti established that government agencies have the ability
to silence some employee speech. But by employing the concept of
management rights, the Garcetti Court also defined the limits of
management's power more clearly than it had in Connick or in any decision
since. An extensive body of law establishes that management's right to
control employees is constrained by past practices in the workplace,276
unionization 7 7 and labor law,27 collective bargaining,2 79 legislation,"' and
other legal rules.28" '
Garcetti thus implies that management's control over its employees is
limited in three ways: by internal restraints such as workplace custom or a
collective bargaining agreement; by external constraints such as laws
prohibiting discrimination, harassment, or laws providing protections for
worker safety and health; and by public policy, which prohibits
management from asking employees to commit criminal actions, or to
engage in activities that pose an immediate threat to the safety or health of
the employee or others. 282
275. 126 S. Ct. at 1960.
276. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 272, at 641 (addressing past practice and industry custom).
277. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 797-8 (1945) (noting that NLRA balances
management rights to maintain discipline against employees' rights to organize and act collectively);
NTEU v. Chertoff, 452 F.3d 839 (D.C. Cit. 2006) (FLRA limits the Department of Homeland Security's
exercise of management rights); Doggett, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80722, *13-14 (in case involving
public employee, citing cases that hold that union activity is provided special protections under the First
Amendment). See generally ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 272, at 642 & nn. 36-38.
278. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 272, at 642 (Noting that "[t]he labor relations acts, by
legitimizing and endorsing collective bargaining, set the stage for overall restriction of management
rights through the provisions of collective bargaining agreements."). The scope of management rights in
the public sector is often defined by law; compare 5 U.S.C. §7106(a) (defining management rights) with
5 U.S.C. §7106(b) (establishing that the procedures by which those rights may be exercised are subject
to bargaining).
279. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 272, at 642. See e.g., St. Louis Symphony Soc'y, 70 LA
475, 481-482 (1978) (holding "management retains all rights of a common law employer which are not
bargained away or limited by the collective bargaining agreement.").
280. Tex. Dep't of County Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981) (holding that under Title
VII management may exercise traditional rights over hiring, so long as there is no discrimination); Swint
v. Pullman-Standard, No. 71-955, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6754, at *33 (N.D. Ala. Sep. 13, 1974) (Title
VII serves as a check on management rights). See generally ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 272, at
641-42 (listing legislation that has restricted management rights).
281. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 272, at 641-42 & nn. 32-47 (listing a range of laws,
including antitrust laws, the FMLA, and OSHA).
282. This last principle is so strong that the general rule is that an employee may refuse to obey an
order to commit a crime or act in a way that poses an immediate threat to health or safety. See American
Arbitration Association Ruling, 2005 AAA LEXIS 298, at *38 (July 20, 2005) (making this point). See
also Beverly Enterprises, 100 LA 522, 529 (Feb. 4, 1993) (employee's reasonable concern for safety
justified his refusal to follow order); Muter Co., 47 LA 332, 335-336 (July 7, 1966) (recognizing
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When the Supreme Court incorporated the idea of management rights
into its analysis of public employee speech rights in Garcetti, it
simultaneously incorporated certain attached limitations on management
rights. The claim of a managerial right to control an employee's statements
establishes that those statements are outside the scope of the First
Amendment's protections. But by the same logic, Garcetti holds that
employees whose speech is not subject to managerial control by virtue of
one of the limits defined above speak not as employees, but rather, as
citizens.283
D. Management Rights & Reserved Rights
In labor law, the doctrine of management rights is complicated by the
theory of reserved management rights, which asserts that rights not
expressly constrained by law (or waived by management through
negotiation or practice) are reserved to the employer.284 The Garcetti Court
offered an interesting twist on the idea of reserved rights when it reaffirmed
the importance of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.285 In effect,
Garcetti established that public employees have a type of reserved rights
derived from the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
This approach adopted by the Court was not the one respondents
preferred. In its brief in support of respondents in Garcetti, the United
States urged the Supreme Court to return to the principles of Rust v.
Sullivan, which created a rule that the government could control its
employees' speech because it "'purchased' the speech ... through a grant
of funding or payment of a salary." '286 The respondents' attorneys offered
employees right to refuse to work in environment with no heat). Cf Transcript Oral Argument at 9-10,
Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1951 (defendants's attorney agreed, during oral argument, that government
control of employees did not extend to asking employees to lie or commit crimes or conceal evidence).
283. The majority articulates this very distinction in the first two paragraphs of Part IV of its
opinion, wheie it distinguishes between laws and regulations that check supervisors' control over
employees, and circumstances in which employees speak on matters relating to their professional duties,
when they are subject to employer's control. 126 S. Ct. at 1962.
284. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 272, at 635 & n.5.
285. For another article that notes the importance of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, and
the threat of"employer orthodoxy," see Stephen A. Yokich, Public Employees' First Amendment Rights
in the Wake ofGarcetti v. Ceballos: The Public Employee's Perspective, 24 ILL. PUB. EMP. REL. REP. 1
(2007).
286. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at
1951 (No. 04-473) 2004 U.S. Briefs 473, at *20-21 (quoting Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 408
n.6). See also Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1951, Transcript Oral Argument at *20 (argument of Mr. Kneedler
for U.S.: "When the Government pays for someone to do its work, it has an absolute right to control and
direct the manner in which that work is performed. This is a basic rule of agency law, and insofar as
Federal employees are concerned, it's a basic rule of our constitutional structure."). Pressed by
members of the Court, Kneedler conceded that agency principles might not command compliance when
a principal ordered an agent to violate Brady, but added that the First Amendment did not provide the
appropriate remedy. Id. at *22. But then he added, "it would be an unconstitutional condition to require
him to put his job at peril for committing a due process violation or something like that... [J" it just
would not be a First Amendment violation since the speech was undertaken as part of job duties. Id.
2008
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an even stronger version of that argument, asserting during oral argument
that the government had an absolute right to control the statements of its
employees, even if that silenced a report of criminal conduct,287 or extended
into a classroom. 288
But the majority in Garcetti refused to go that far. On the contrary, the
majority opinion offers the strongest restatement of the place of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine in public employee speech cases in
recent years.289  The opinion opens with an invocation of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine,29 and its discussion of the Pickering
line of cases in Part II of the opinion emphasizes that doctrine as well.29'
Part II begins with a review of the development of that doctrine:
As the Court's decisions have noted, for many years "the unchallenged
dogma was that a public employee had no right to object to the conditions
placed upon the terms of employment-including those which restricted the
exercise of constitutional rights." That dogma has been qualified in
important respects. The Court has made it clear that public employees do
not surrender all their First Amendment rights by reason of their
employment. Rather, the First Amendment protects a public employee's
right, in certain circumstances, to speak as a citizen addressing matters of
public concern. 92
The majority restates the doctrine in the middle of Part II of its
opinion, noting that "the Court has recognized that a citizen who works for
the government is nonetheless a citizen. The First Amendment limits the
ability of a public employer to leverage the employment relationship to
restrict, indirectly or intentionally, the liberties employees enjoy in their
capacity as private citizens." '93  This part of the opinion ends with a
See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) OF AGENCY, § 8.15 note D (2005) ("the [prinoipal's] duty to
refrain from conduct likely to injure the agent's business reputation or reasonable self-respect"). The
Reporter's comments cite Malik v. Bank of Credit and Commerce Int'l S.A., [1998] A.C. 20 (H.L.),
where it was held that innocent managers of a bank that "operated in a dishonest and corrupt fashion"
had a claim for breach of this duty.
287. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1951, Transcript Oral Argument at *5-6 (Mar. 21, 2005) (arguments by
Ms. Lee). Cf 126 S. Ct. at 1968 (Souter, J., dissenting) (expressing the fear that the majority opinion
would be read as an extension of Rust so that "any statement made within the scope of public
employment is (or should be treated as) the government's own speech.")
288. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1951, Transcript Oral Argument, (Oct. 12, 2005) (arguments by Ms.
Lee) ("Well, it would be our view that if the job duties of that university professor was to speak on a
particular topic or content and they were getting paid to do that, that is a job-required speech and it
should not be entitled, presumptively, to First Amendment protection .... ). See http: //www.oyez.org/
cases/2000-2009/2005/2005_04_473/ argument.
289. Cf discussion at supra notes 61-82.
290. 126 S. Ct. at 1955.
291. Id. at 1957-59.
292. Id. at 1957 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 143 (internal citations omitted)).
293. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1958 (citing Perry, 408 U.S. at 597).
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statement of the balancing approach that Pickering and its progeny require
as a result of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.294
Far from reading public employee speech issues in light of Rust, the
majority used management rights theory to reinforce Rosenberger and to
limit Rust further. 95 It equated the university in Rosenberger to an
employer who had a right to managerial control over official duties, but
lacked the power to control statements made by public employees outside
their official acts.296 Presumably the other protections that the Court
recognized in Rosenberger and Velazquez applied as well, limiting the
public employer's ability to restrict the expression of ideas to advance a
particular orthodoxy by silencing other ideas.297
Garcetti did not limit the protections granted to public employees by
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Rather, the doctrine now serves as
an additional limit on managerial power. While the managerial rights of
private employers are limited by agreements and laws, the managerial rights
of public employers are restrained by the U.S. Constitution. As the Court
concludes in its opinion, legislative enactments, ethical constraints, and
"obligations arising from any other applicable constitutional provisions and
mandates of the criminal and civil laws, protect employees and provide
checks on supervisors who would order unlawful or otherwise inappropriate
actions." 298 They do so by carving out exceptions to the managerial rights
that employers, public and private, have over the "expressions employees
make pursuant to their professional duties. ' 299  By limiting employers'
rights, those provisions set the boundaries between employees and citizens.
VI.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos may indeed have
"profoundly altered how courts review First Amendment retaliation
claims,"300 but it should not be assumed that the change significantly rolled
back public employee speech rights. Instead, by characterizing those rights
in relation to management rights and the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine, the Court clarified its previous case law in a way that should
increase the protections for public employees in the long run. In areas
where a public employer has managerial control over the message
294. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1959.
295. Id. at 1960.
296. Id. (making this distinction between Rosenberger and Pickering).
297. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 835; Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 542-43.
298. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1962.
299. Id.
300. Casey, 473 F.3d at 1325.
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expressed, public employees may only speak as employees, and therefore
lack the protection of the First Amendment. But in areas where
management's rights are constrained by the constitution, laws, contracts, or
public policy, a public employee may speak as a citizen, and under
Garcetti, those statements are protected by the First Amendment.
VII.
APPENDIX
Abbatiello v. County of Kauai, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8906 (D. Ha.
2007) (not clear that the police officer who reported misconduct by officers
in her division had a duty to do so; possible First Amendment claim).
Andrew v. Clark, 472 F.Supp. 2d 659 (D. Md. 2007) (police officer; no
protection).
Batt v. City of Oakland, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77087 (N.D. Cal.
2006) (police officer; comments may be protected).
Bland v. Winant, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31094 (D.N.J. 2007) (police
officer; no protection).
Boyd v. Georgia Dept of Public Safety, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14805
(M.D. Ga. 2007) (member of Georgia State Patrol; no protection).
Bradley v. Jones, 429 F.3d 536 (8th Cir. 2007) (police officer; no
protection).
Brewster v. City of Poughkeepsie, 434 F.Supp.2d 155 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(police officer; no protection).
Broderick v. Evans, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23698 (D. Mass. 2007)
(police officer; no protection).
Burke v. Nitman, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15329 (D. Colo. 2007)
(security officer in juvenile home; emails may be protected).
Bums v. Borough of Glassborough, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42069
(D.N.J. 2007) (police officer; no protection).
Campbell v. Galloway, 483 F.3d 258 (4th Cir. 2007) (police officer; no
protection).
Cheek v. City of Edwardsville, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71354 (D. Kan.
2006) (police officer; statements may be protected).
DePrado v. City of Miami, 446 F.Supp. 2d 1344 (S.D. Fla. 2006)
(police officer; no protection).
Dillon v. Fermon, 2006 US. Dist. LEXIS 59650 (C.D. 111. 2006)
(police officer; no protection).
Fairley v. Fermiant, 482 F.3d 897 (7th Cir. 2006) (prison guards,
statements not protected; testimony at civil rights trials should be).
Frietag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528 (9th Cir. 2006) (prison guard; some
statements are protected).
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Franklin v. Clark 454 F.Supp. 2d 356 (D. Md. 2006) (police officer; no
protection).
Harris v. Tunian County, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7473 (N.D. Miss.
2007) (jailer; statements may be protected).
Haynes v. City of Circeville, 474 F.3d 357 (6th Cir. 2007) (police
officer; no protection).
lott v. Carter, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17517 (D. Or. 2007)
(correctional officer; not protected).
Jennings v. County of Washtenaw, 475 F. Supp. 2d 692 (E.D. Mich.
2007) (staff worker in juvenile home; no protection).
Mills v. City of Evansville, 452 F.3d 646 (7th Cir. 2006) (prison guard;
no protection).
Morales v. Jones, 2207 U.S. App. LEXIS 16936 (7th Cir. 2007) (police
officers, testimony protected, statements to district attorney are not).
Price v. MacLeish, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57026 (D. Del. 2006) (state
troopers; no protection).
Sigsworth v City of Aurora, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12204 (7th Cir.
2007) (police officer; no protection).
Skrutski v. Henry County, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41780 (N.D. Geo.
2007) (state trooper; question of fact whether statements protected).
Skrutski v. Marut, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37866 (M.D. Pa. 2007)
(refusing to enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict in case in which
police officer established that he was retaliated against for complaining to a
supervisor when his superior officer ordered him to falsify evidence, and for
filing a subsequent law suit).
Spiegla v. Hull, 481 F.3d 961 (7th Cir. 2007) (prison guard; no
protection).
Stassi v. Lou-Gold, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13643 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(police officer; no protection).
Vose v. Kliment, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39944 (C.D. Ill. 2007) (police
officer; remarks may be protected).
Walters v. County of Maricopa, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60272 (D.
Ariz. 2006) (police officer; whistle blowing may be protected).
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